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Preface 
The general aim of this thesis is to promote the patient safety issue to become 
a major issue in the Norwegian healthcare system. The rationale behind this is 
the fact that patient safety has become the most dominating healthcare issue 
in western countries during the last decade. In the following I will present some 
pieces of information to make the reading more comprehensive and rewarding 
for the reader.  
The starting point has been trying to understand and explain the processes in 
the present time healthcare system, like patient safety, on the basis of the 
historical knowledge from the past. This historical journey begins with 
Hippocrates, goes through western countries´ industrialization, and ends up in 
our modern time where quality and patient safety has become central system 
issues. The healthcare quality and patient safety has been discussed from two 
different perspectives, first a general healthcare perspective and then from a 
more specific intensive care unit perspective. However, there are occasions 
where general quality and patient safety discussions do not proceed to their 
corresponding specific intensive care unit (ICU) discussions.   
My first intention throughout the text has been to encourage the reader to 
compare the patient safety condition in other western countries with that in 
our country by presenting the facts as the most substantial platform of 
comparison. My second intention has been trying to stimulate the reader to 
critically compare the safety issues and how they are handled in other high risk 
industries with those in healthcare.  
The structure of the text is not organized according to only strict boundaries 
between the concepts, meaning that the same concept may be discussed in 
different settings with different approaches like “audit” or “evidence-based 
medicine”. In fact, there is a narrative sense of “telling the history”, which is 
thought to make the text more vivid and dynamic and give a broad and holistic 
view of the concept to the reader.  
Regarding the references, as a general rule the reference number has been put 
directely after the corresponding sentence or paragraph. Furthermore, web 
references are also treated in this manner consistently, but the difference is 
that instead of reference number the whole web address is presented. 
However, besides the general rule of putting the reference number 
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immediately after the sentences or paragraphs, when appropriate and in some 
short sections, the reference numbers are collectively placed at the end of the 
section. The first reason for doing this is to try to offer a continuous text, 
which is not interrupted repeatedly by reference numbers. The second reason 
was the wish to create a floating, dynamic, and harmonic text by combining the 
different concepts presented in the different original references in the same 
place. However, where the content of the text is crucial (like in “Résumé”) the 
reference numbers are currently and frequently placed immediately after the 
corresponding sentences.  
Direct citations have been presented in italic and marked with quoting signs. 
Those direct citations with a longer length have been presented in appendices 
at the end of the thesis.   
At the end I hope the reader finds the reading of this piece of work enjoyable 
and she/he is inspired by the thoughts presented in it.   
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Summary 
There is a need for us, Norwegian physicians, to develop our patient safety 
knowledge, attitude, and practice. The components of this should include the 
notions that errors are common and many of them are preventable. Moreover, 
simple techniques can imply substantial impact on preventing errors or 
reducing their effects. We need a strong leadership directed towards patient 
safety, and we need to be convinced that our leaders and employers support us 
in our efforts to improve patient safety.  
Norwegian Medical Association stated in December 2006 that the work of 
patient safety is still in its starting phase in Norwegian healthcare system and 
included five suggestions for promoting patient safety. These suggestions are in 
accordance with the results of the extensive literature survey performed in this 
thesis. The suggestions were constructed by "cooperation, culture, 
professionalism, regulations, and technology". Co-operation between the 
medical profession, governmental authorities, and the public is of vital 
importance to achieve a high quality patient safety policy and practice. 
Without cooperation it is impossible to promote the culture of patient safety 
and professionalism. Continuous medical education and continuous professional 
development are cornerstones of professionalism that should be improved along 
with a well-defined adherent financing system. Regarding regulations we should 
take into consideration the experiences from other comparable countries and 
be open-minded to them. These experiences may include the Danish hospital 
accreditation program and the program of individual practitioner revalidation in 
the United Kingdom, both aiming for system changes for promoting patient 
safety.  
In connection with this thesis, we performed a limited survey of perceived 
concepts of patient safety among the physician-leaders of ICUs in the 
Norwegian university hospitals as well as those Norwegian physicians who are 
the members of European Society of Intensive Care Medicine. This survey 
illustrated that the great majority of physicians believe that it is necessary to 
improve patient safety in the ICUs. This is also in accordance with the 
statement from Norwegian Medical Association in 2006: "there is a lack of 
systems for nationwide dissemination and implementation of the achieved 
experiences and knowledge".  
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It seems that promoting patient safety is primarily a question of culture and 
attitudes. It remains to see whether a change of attitudes and culture can be 
achieved without going through regulations.  
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1. Introduction 
Every day there are many patients who are harmed or even die because of 
medical errors. In the Declaration of Vienna (a statement from European 
Society of Intensive Care Medicine 2009) it was stated that a significant number 
of dangerous human errors occur in intensive  care units (ICUs). The costs of 
errors are high, both in terms of human suffering and in economic terms. 
Patient safety is a vast field of knowledge aiming to prevent errors and harm to 
the patients. Patient safety is a key indicator of the healthcare quality. Both 
healthcare organizations and the individual physicians have a responsibility in 
patient safety and healthcare quality. It has been estimated that one in ten 
patients in the hospitals in the United Kingdom (UK) experiences an incident 
which increases the risk of harm which can even lead to death (reference). Half 
of these incidents are preventable. It is known that system failure explains the 
majority of these incidents, but there are still concerns about the competence 
of the physicians.  
This thesis will discuss the relative roles of the systems and the practitioners in 
patient safety and quality of care. Among all the practitioners in healthcare, 
the focus of this thesis will be on physicians. The role of physicians will be 
discussed in a historical perspective and especially with respect to the 
phenomenon called industrialization of medicine. Fast and huge developments 
of science and technology and consequently the considerable increase in 
medical knowledge are regarded as the causes of the industrialization of 
medicine which has changed the way of practicing medicine in many medical 
domains. With respect to medical specialties the emphasis will be on critical 
care and intensive care medicine. The role of essential factors influencing 
patient safety and healthcare quality like the culture of healthcare units 
including intensive care units (ICUs), financing systems, and leadership will be 
analyzed. Later, different improvement approaches will be described and 
finally a survey on patient safety and continuous medical education (CME) will 
be presented and discussed.  
13 
 
2. Medical profession 
History 
It is necessary to understand the current culture of medical profession when 
approaching the issue of patient safety. The history of medical profession, as a 
profession, constitutes the solid base of its current culture. In this section we 
shortly discuss the contribution of Hippocrates and his strong influence in 
building the medical profession.   
Hippocrates (460–377 BC) is considered to be the father of the medical 
profession. He was born on the island of Cos and died at an old age in Larissa. 
He lived in the 5th century BC, the "golden era" of Greek history and created a 
famous medical school on Cos around 430 BC. Hippocrates regarded the patient 
as a whole and promoted a holistic approach in medical science. He proposed a 
detailed history taking from the patient, evaluation of the symptoms, and 
performing a meticulous clinical examination by inspection, auscultation, and 
palpation. He believed the physician’s role lies in helping the therapeutic 
power of nature, which gradually results in the patient’s health. Hippocrates 
took into consideration the existing knowledge of medicine and changed the 
course of medical practice. He supported the idea that medical treatment must 
depend on clinical observation and experimentation, and separated medicine 
from philosophical speculations, superstitions, magic, and religion. He set the 
grounds for medicine to develop as a systematic science. Hippocrates was 
deeply concerned about medical ethics and believed that in order to cure a 
patient the doctor should know him well. The Hippocratic Oath which includes 
the codes of medical conduct and attitude, has served as a very solid platform 
of medical profession during the centuries (1).  
 
Hippocratic Oath 
The original version of the Hippocratic Oath translated by J Chadwick and WN 
Mann in 1950 is as follow: 
“I swear by Apollo the healer, by Aesculapius, by Health and all the 
powers of healing, and call to witness all the gods and goddesses that I 
may keep this Oath and Promise to the best of my ability and judgment. 
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I will pay the same respect to my master in the Science as to my parents 
and share my life with him and pay all my debts to him. I will regard his 
sons as my brothers and teach them the Science, if they desire to learn 
it, without fee or contract. I will hand on precepts, lectures and all 
other learning to my sons, to those of my master and to those pupils 
duly apprenticed and sworn, and to none other. 
I will use my power to help the sick to the best of my ability and 
judgment; I will abstain from harming or wronging any man by it. 
I will not give a fatal draught to anyone if I am asked, nor will I suggest 
any such thing. Neither will I give a woman means to procure an 
abortion. 
I will be chaste and religious in my life and in my practice. 
I will not cut, even for the stone, but I will leave such procedures to the 
practitioners of that craft. 
Whenever I go into a house, I will go to help the sick and never with the 
intention of doing harm or injury. I will not abuse my position to indulge 
in sexual contacts with the bodies of women or of men, whether they be 
freemen or slaves. 
Whatever I see or hear, professionally or privately, which ought not to 
be divulged, I will keep secret and tell no one. 
If, therefore, I observe this Oath and do not violate it, may I prosper 
both in my life and in my profession, earning good repute among all men 
for my time. If I transgress and forswear this oath, may my lot be 
otherwise.” 
 
The importance of the Oath was twofold; firstly it constituted a strong 
profession of the followers of Asclepius, and secondly this profession for the 
first time in the history was completely dedicated to life and aiming only to 
cure under all circumstances. The Hippocratic Oath became the essence of all 
ethical codes and medical professional standards for all years to come 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A1103798). 
Classically, there were only three professions: divinity, medicine, and law. 
Professional autonomy, which is a quite central concept in professions, includes 
independency and self-regulation “without undue outside influence”. 
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Declaration of Madrid 
World Medical Association (WMA) is considered to be the body of the medical 
profession in the present time. As the global professional body WMA regulates 
and coordinates the ethical and practical codes of the medical profession in our 
modern society. “The declaration of Madrid”, produced by WMA, may be 
regarded as the modern version of the Hippocratic Oath. A survey of 
“Declaration of Madrid on Professionally-led Regulation”, which in October 
2009 was adopted by WMA general assembly, illustrates the very components of 
the codes of the medical profession. 
“WMA Declaration of Madrid on Professionally-led Regulation: 
The collective action by the medical profession seeking for the benefit 
of patients, in assuming responsibility for implementing a system of 
professionally-led regulation will enhance and assure the individual 
physician's right to treat patients without interference, based on his or 
her best clinical judgment. Therefore, the WMA urges the national 
medical associations and all physicians to take the following actions. 
1. Physicians have been granted by society a high degree of 
professional autonomy and clinical independence, whereby they 
are able to make recommendations based on the best interests of 
their patients without undue outside influence. 
2. As a corollary to the right of professional autonomy and clinical 
independence, the medical profession has a continuing 
responsibility to be self-regulating. Ultimate control and 
decision-making authority must rest with physicians, based on 
their specific medical training, knowledge, experience and 
expertise. 
3. Physicians in each country are urged to establish, maintain and 
actively participate in a legitimate system of professionally-led 
regulation. This dedication is to ultimately assure full clinical 
independence in patient care decisions. 
4. To avoid being influenced by the inherent potential conflicts of 
interest that will arise from assuming both representational and 
regulatory duties, National Medical Associations must do their 
utmost to promote and support the concept of professionally-led 
regulation amongst their membership and the public. 
5. Any system of professionally-led regulation must ensure 
a) the quality of the care provided to patients,               
b) the competence of the physician providing that care and 
c) the professional conduct of physician.  
To ensure the patient quality continuing care, physicians must 
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participate actively in the process of Continuing Professional 
Development in order to update and maintain their clinical 
knowledge, skills and competence. 
6. The professional conduct of physicians must always be within the 
bounds of the Code of Ethics governing physicians in each country. 
National Medical Associations must promote professional and 
ethical conduct among physicians for the benefit of their 
patients. Ethical violations must be promptly recognized and 
reported. The physicians who have erred must be appropriately 
disciplined and where possible be rehabilitated. 
7. National Medical Associations are urged to assist each other in 
coping with new and developing problems, including potential 
inappropriate threats to professionally-led regulation. The 
ongoing exchange of information and experiences between 
National Medical Associations is essential for the benefit of 
patients. 
8. An effective and responsible system of professionally-led 
regulation by the medical profession in each country must not be 
self serving or internally protective of the profession, and the 
process must be fair, reasonable and sufficiently transparent to 
ensure this.  National Medical Associations should assist their 
members in understanding that self-regulation cannot only be 
perceived as being protective of physicians, but must maintain 
the safety, support and confidence of the general public as well 
as the honour of the profession itself.” 
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3. Industrialization of medicine 
History 
The industrialization of medicine in recent decades threatens the medical 
autonomy. Doctors’ freedom to choose what they believe to be appropriate 
management for their patients is increasingly being modified (2). Initially, the 
driving horses of the industrialization of goods production were science and 
technology. It was in fact the new equipments that made it possible to 
transform from the handicraft way of producing goods to the industrial way of 
doing it.  The same is true about the industrialization of medicine that is based 
on the amazing rate of increasing medical science and technological 
developments. The new and complicated medical equipments in hospitals need 
new human resources with new competencies. This process totally differs from 
the introduction of new technologies and new equipments into traditional 
industries that normally led to reduced human resources. In the hospitals there 
is no longer a multi-competent “craftsman” who is in charge and takes the 
responsibility for the results. Now there are cooperating and organizing in 
multi-disciplinary teams which stands for the results. 
The concept of profession and professional autonomy has strong similarities 
with the concept of handcraft and handicraft mode of goods production. In this 
mode the production is done by hand and the craftsman masters the entire 
process of production and the end result of it. Here the craftsman's skills and 
individual ability are central factors in production. In contrast, the 
industrialized medicine is characterized by industrial mode of production that 
may be summarized by a division of labor between and within work processes 
and the automatizing of work tasks. The differences between handicraft mode 
of production and industrial mode of production may be summarized as follow 
(3) : 
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The differences between handicraft and industrial mode of production: 
 
	   Handicraft	  
 
Industrial 
	  
Who is the leader? 
	  
The most experienced 
craftsman  
	  
The leader of enterprise 
 
	  
Who owns the methods 
and procedures? 
	  
Craftsman is the owner of 
methods (individual 
ownership) 
	  
Enterprise owns the 
procedures	  
What are the 
characteristics for 
product development? 
	  
Integrated into the 
production	  
Separated as 
development units	  
How does the knowledge 
transfer? 
	  
Individual-based (from 
master to journeyman)	  
Explicitly product-based 
(there is a need for those 
who know the procedures 
but no need for 
craftsman) 
	  
How does the cooperation 
occur? 
	  
Inter specialty (every 
craftsman is specialized 
in his field) 
	  
Cross specialty (multi-
disciplinary team) 
	  
How are the decisions 
made? 
	  
Individual (craftsman 
finds the solutions when 
the problems encounter) 
	  
Evidence-based 
	  
What defines the value of 
a product? 
	  
The procedure (the value 
is the way of producing 
the product) 
	  
The product itself 
(Mercedes Benz, Armani) 
	  
What characterizes the 
procedures? 
	  
Tailor-made 
	  
Standardized  
	  
In Norway, the healthcare reform in 2002 was a clear turn towards industrial 
steering of hospitals. Competition and economic incentives as well as cost 
effective products and services have been stressed on in “New Public 
Management”. The industrialization of healthcare was first initiated at the end 
of 20th century. This process became more visible in the last decade where the 
roles of patients and physicians were altered. Patients gained a status more 
similar to customers and should no more be treated as clients or receivers of 
welfare, while physicians became more like suppliers and less as advisers or 
guardians. This alteration of roles was formalized in the law of The Rights of 
19 
 
Patients in 2000. Further in 2001, in The Law of Caregivers, the right of the 
patient as co-decision maker and controller was emphasized. Additionally, the 
way of financing the hospitals by the government was changed and based on 
“diagnosis related group” (DRG). DRG is a classification system using some 400 
major diagnostic categories that assign patients into different case types. DRG 
is used to facilitate assessment of the resource utilization and patient case mix. 
It is also used to determine the hospital reimbursement (4). In this system the 
price is set for the product itself, similar to the industrial price setting, and not 
the way the product is produced which is the handicraft way of price setting. 
Interesting enough, in DRG-systems there is no pay for the costs of 
development and marketing in contrast to the industrial traditions. In health 
care settinga this corresponds to no pay for the costs of research and teaching 
which exerts a negative impact on the quality of care in the long run. 
Role of experience in the industrialized medicine 
Experience has been quite central in the medical profession as well as in 
handicraft way of goods production. In these contexts it was not a coincident 
that the most experienced craftsman or physician used to also become a 
leader.  
Practicing medicine has always consisted of two components; namely skill and 
knowlede. Until the amazing acceleration of science and technology, medicine 
was practiced mostly as an art, an experienced-based art, where skills had a 
quite dominant position. In a sense experience and skills also contained the 
knowledge of medicine. This dogma changed parallel to industrialization of 
medicine and the revolution of science and technology. Now practicing 
medicine is knowledge-based. However, the relative importance of skills and 
knowledge in each single domain or discipline of medicine is variable. It is 
obvious that skills generally still have a dominant importance in surgery-based 
disciplines while knowledge is of vital importance in all disciplines. A good 
example of this would be liver transplantation. The surgical part of 
transplantation needs a long surgical skill and sufficient experience to perform 
but the patient will not survive without knowledge of medicine to manage 
her/him until an organ is accessible (which may take years) as well as for 
instance immunological knowledge which is quite necessary for managing of 
patient after transplantation.  
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Unfortunately, experience is still regarded as the central part of practicing 
medicine of some physicians. This could of course be true, but for a couple of 
hundreds of years ago. In 2000 a Norwegian physician wrote in The Journal of 
the Norwegian Medical Association: “no one can deny the value of experience, 
but it has also been said that experience is the most common excuse for the 
lack of knowledge” (5). In 2005, the central role of experience in the medical 
profession was seriously challenged. In this year, a systematic review article 
published in "Annals of Internal Medicine" and concluded that the clinicians get 
worse with increasing experience (6). The authors, all from Harvard medical 
school, searched MEDLINE articles in English from 1966 to June 2004 as well as 
the reference lists of the retrieved articles. The selection criterion was articles 
providing empirical results about knowledge or a quality-of-care outcome with 
inclusion of years since graduation or physician age as explanatory variables. 
The studies were categorized on the basis of the nature of the association 
between years in practice or age and performance. 52% of the selected 62 
articles  reported decreasing performance with increasing years in practice for 
all outcomes assessed, 21% reported decreasing performance with increasing 
experience for some outcomes but no association for others, 3% reported that 
performance initially increased with increasing experience, peaked, and then 
decreased, 21% reported no association, 2% reported increasing performance 
with increasing years in practice for some outcomes but no association for 
others; and 2% reported increasing performance with increasing years in 
practice for all outcomes. The limitation of study, as the authors themselves 
admited, was the lack of reliable search terms for physician experience and 
therefore important reports may have been missed. The authors concluded that 
“physicians who have been in practice longer may be at risk for providing 
lower-quality care. Therefore, this subgroup of physicians may need quality 
improvement interventions” (6). "American College of Physicians" and 
"American Board of Internal Medicine", two prestigious medical organizations, 
commented the paper as follows:”The profession cannot ignore this striking 
finding and its implications: Practice does not make perfect, but it must be 
accompanied by ongoing active effort to maintain competence and quality of 
care”.  This was a milestone in the history of the medical profession; the fact 
that experience alone may be dangerous.  
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Quality in production industries as a consequence of 
industrialization 
In the beginning of the twentieth century the need for a rational working 
organization in the industrial world was urgent. To meet this need Fredrick 
Taylor, an American engineer, established the “scientific management theory”. 
He believed that substitution of “rule-of-thumb” with scientific methods would 
result in enormous gains in the production of goods. The three most important 
characteristics of Taylor’s scientific management theory were: the breakdown 
of the process of work into small moments, the separation of work planning and 
work performing, and the central inspection and control (7). Taylor’s 
contribution is the introduction of a systematic and scientific management 
method; however he is also criticized for the removal of creativity in the work 
process. Regarding the element of central inspection and control in Taylor’s 
theory, the large volume of production during 1930s made it impossible to 
inspect every single product and explain the reasons behind the production of 
defect products.  
 
During the same period Shewart and his colleagues in the Bell’s laboratories 
were developing statistical methods for sample control and finding the cause of 
errors. Their work resulted in development of standards (7). Then until the 
Second World War the use of statistical methods, establishment of the quality 
standards, and the internal inspection and control (self-control) were routine. 
After the war and until 1980s, focus on the production line, quality as the 
quality of goods, quality as a field for experts, and process steering where 
dominating quality trends. During 1970s Japan gained exceeding amount of the 
production market. The Japanese explained their success as a consequence of 
applying the theories of Total Quality Control and Total Quality Management. 
During the 1980s Total Quality Management was recognized in the West and 
was described as user-orientation, process orientation, having focus on the 
multi-disciplinary form of organizing work, holistic approach, and continuous 
improvement. In 1990s the theory of Continuous Quality Improvement became 
appreciated as well as process management, and “Plan, Do, Study, Act” (7).  
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In industry, there have been defined three levels of quality: conformance 
quality which refers to being guided by predetermined standards and 
specifications, requirements quality which refers to meeting total customer 
requirements, and quality of kind which refers to an extraordinary quality that 
delights the customers by exceeding their expectations. Conformance quality is 
the easiest level to achieve and quality of kind the most difficult level. Quality 
assurance in healthcare (explained later on in this paper) is similar to 
conformance quality (8). 
4. Intensive care medicine and ICU characteristics 
ICU is a clinical micro-system and share similarities with other clinical frontline 
micro-systems in healthcare organizations. Clinical micro-systems are living and 
complex systems that have some structures, some patterns of relationships, 
and some processes to create work and output (9). There are some 
dissimilarities but many similarities between the industrial mode of production 
of goods and the mode of work in intensive care units. Dissimilarities are in 
many cases about the exact description and performing of the work process in 
industrial production and the existing plans for adverse events. One important 
similarity is the complexity of work, which necessitates multi-disciplinary way 
of work organization, cross specialty cooperation, evidence based decision-
making and the use of standardized procedures to avoid variability. Intensive 
care medicine (ICM) or critical care medicine (CCM) is usually defined as the 
crossroads between science, advanced technology, practical medicine and 
ethics. The first function of ICM is taking care of acutely ill patients who have 
life-threatening and potentially reversible organs dysfunction. The second 
function of ICM is providing intensive monitoring and organ support for elective 
patients who undergo complex interventional procedures and are at the risk of 
developing organ dysfunction. ICM is by nature multispecialty and 
multidisciplinary. Multispecialty in the sense that multiple medical specialties 
are involved in their specialty’s critically ill patients (medicine, surgery, 
neurosurgery, pediatrics) and multidisciplinary in the sense that multiple 
categories of caregivers (critical care nurses, pharmacists, nutritionists, social 
workers, physical therapists –respiratory therapists in North America) are 
involved in caring for these patients.  
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ICM is practiced in an ICU, which is a specially equipped hospital ward with 
specially trained personnel prepared to take care of critically ill patients. The 
origin of ICUs may be traced back to the postoperative recovery room 
established in Massachusetts General Hospital in 1873. However, it was 
poliomyelitis epidemic and the need of long term ventilation of patients in the 
early 1950s that triggered the development of ICUs in both Europe and the US. 
The benefits of ICUs were gradually realized and resulted in increased interest 
in ICUs in the 1970s and early 1980s. During this period the annual usage of ICUs 
increased 8% in USA and nearly 5% in Canada. The ICUs in different hospitals 
(university hospitals, regional hospitals, and local hospitals) have different 
functions offering various types of services with different levels of complexity. 
The most complex ICUs are university hospital ICUs which should offer all 
required aspects of intensive care. Hospitals may organize their ICU beds as 
multiple units divided according to different areas of expertise and managed by 
a single discipline specialty (medical, surgical, neonatal, neurosurgery, burn, 
cardiac surgery, or trauma). However, there are good economic and 
operational arguments for multispecialty ICUs against single specialty ones. The 
number of ICU beds in a hospital usually ranges from 1 to 4 per 100 hospital 
beds (10). Multispecialty ICUs, especially if high dependency beds (intermediary 
beds) are not available in the hospital, would require more beds than single 
specialty ones. ICUs with less than 4 beds are considered not to be cost-
effective, whereas those with 20 beds may be difficult to manage. ICU is an 
expensive unit in hospital and uses 8% of total hospital budget (14-20% in USA).  
 
In the last four decades the knowledge of ICM has been developed along with 
the development of ICUs. Intensive care physicians must be experts on this 
knowledge that includes among others pathophysiology, special management 
techniques, professionalism, and ethics. The diagnosis and management of 
critically ill patients in practice is different from other patients and usually 
require a rapid initial assessment and rapid initiation of treatment before 
establishing a diagnosis. There is a need for frequent assessment of the patient 
since the disease process may be rapidly changing. The treatment plans often 
consist of therapeutic trials with predetermined treatment goals and 
predetermined responses to possible complications. Critical ill patients are at 
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higher risk of iatrogenic complications and assessment of developing or 
potential iatrogenic complications is an important part of the management 
plan. However, we have made advances to understand the nature of iatrogenic 
complications better and learned how to avoid them. The best example of this 
is probably the introduction of lung-protective mechanical ventilation.  
 
Advances in ICM have resulted in increased survival for critically ill patients. 
Other medical and interventional treatment modalities (malignancies, surgical 
and other interventional techniques) have also developed and led to increased 
survival. Additionally, there is also an increasing rate of aging population in the 
society. These factors have accordingly changed the demographics of the ICU 
patient population and created new changes like sepsis and multi-organ failure. 
The prevalence of these serious conditions is increasing while there are only 
supportive therapies and no causal therapies for them.  
There is always a need for improvement of performance and ICUs are no 
exceptions. There are several process improvement measures and 
organizational improvement measures, both within and outside ICUs, creating a 
great potential for improving patient outcomes. These improvement measures 
which are at least of the same importance as many novel therapeutic 
interventions, need to be systematically implemented to achieve their 
potential of improving patient safety. Some of these measures are as follow: 
the presence of a medical director with specialist training in intensive care 
medicine, continuous day and night access to intensivist physician (physician 
with the subspecialty of intensive care medicine or critical care medicine), 
daily treatment plan, protocolized delivery of mechanical ventilation, sedation 
protocols, and daily stop of sedation. Success in process optimization requires 
great leadership, communication, and organizational skills. Quality control and 
continuous process improvement must be integrated in the daily practice of ICU 
(10;11).   
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5. Quality in healthcare 
Definitions of quality 
There are many proposed definitions for quality of care, and at the same time a 
lack of an agreed consensus on how to define it. Table 1 presents the currently 
used healthcare quality definitions in medical literature (12). 
 
Table 1*: Definitions of quality of care 
 
* Reprinted with permission.  
The Institute of Medicine’s definition from 1990 indicates that quality is 
measured as a scale or degree rather than a binary system. This definition 
refers to health services and by doing this includes all aspects of care. Further, 
this definition covers the notion that the desired quality outcomes should be 
general, despite the fact that quality may be assessed by the perspective of an 
individual or a population. This allows that different perspectives like those of 
professionals, patients, and public to be taken into consideration. This 
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definition also indicates that the link between quality and outcome is rarely 
causal (increase the likelihood), and that quality of care should be judged 
relative to current professional knowledge (13). In addition to Institute of 
Medicine, Avedis Donabedian (14) has played a substantial role in increasing 
awareness of healthcare quality. He comprehended healthcare quality as the 
product of two factors; the science and technology of healthcare, and the 
application of that science and technology in actual practice. He proposed that 
the quality in healthcare could be characterized by several attributes i.e. 
efficacy, effectiveness, efficiency, optimality, acceptability, legitimacy and 
equity.  
 
In summer 2010, Norwegian Knowledge Centre for the Health Services published 
and important report entitled “Conceptual Framework for a National 
Healthcare Quality Indicator System in Norway – Recommendations” (15). In 
this report a new definition of quality in Norwegian healthcare system was 
suggested. The new definition is “quality means the degree to which the 
activities of healthcare services increase the likelihood of a desirable health-
related welfare for individuals and population groups, and the services are 
performed in accordance with current professional knowledge” (translation by 
Albert Castellheim).  
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Dimensions of quality 
Like Donabedian, several authors and organizations have described the concept 
of quality, by using dimensions of quality, in an attempt to defining it. Table 2 
summarizes these attempts. 
Table 2*: Dimensions of quality of care (12): 
 
 
* Reprinted with permission.  
Efficacy is the ability of the science and technology of healthcare to produce 
improvements in health when used under the most favorable circumstances. 
Effectiveness is the degree to which theoretically available improvements are 
in reality accomplished.  
Efficiency is the ability to lower the costs without decreasing available 
improvements.  
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Optimality is the balancing of improvements in health against the costs of 
such improvements.  
Acceptability is recognition of the wishes, desires and expectations of 
patients and their families.  
Legitimacy is compliance to social preferences as expressed in ethical 
principles, values, norms, traditions, laws, and regulations.  
Equity is coherence with a principle that determines what is fair in the 
distribution of healthcare and its benefits among members of the population. 
Equity is different from equality. Equity is a consideration of fairness where in 
a given circumstance some individuals within a group with the same medical 
condition will receive more care based on their different and better ability to 
benefit the given care. 
 
There is important to note that the definitions of some mentioned concepts like 
efficiency and effectiveness may vary in different knowledge fields like quality 
and patient safety, economics, and administration.   
 
Structure, process, and outcome  
According to Donabedian, the overall quality in medicine comprises of three 
areas; structure, process, and result. The industrial nomenclatures for the 
same concepts are input, throughput, and output.  
Structure quality describes the resources available. For instance in an 
intensive care unit (ICU) it would consist of the design of the unit, rooms, 
equipments, human resources like nurses and physicians, educational resources 
and competency, and finally organisation and management resources. Quality 
standards can be set by national health and regulatory authorities or intensive 
care societies. 
Process quality describes all the events during the hospitalization, from 
admission to discharge, and includes how things are being done (processes). 
Effectiveness of communication, misunderstandings, omissions, timings, and 
the use of guidelines are important elements in process quality.  
Outcome quality describes what the ICU has produced by using its 
structures and by applying its processes. Important outcome measures are the 
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following: mortality in the ICU, mortality at hospital discharge and at 6 or 12 
months, quality of life and functional status at 6 or 12 months, severity 
adjusted mortality rates, ICU readmission rate, nosocomial events (nosocomial 
infections, accidental extubations, decubitus ulcers), number and severity of 
adverse events and errors, complications, and patient and family satisfaction 
(16).  
As mentioned above communication is an important element in process quality. 
It has been estimated that 85% of errors across industries result from failures in 
communication. Impaired communication may occur between patient and 
healthcare professionals, between family and healthcare professionals, in the 
shift-to-shift report, between units in case of transfer for instance, and 
between members of healthcare team. There is a need for physicians to be 
familiar with communication skills and use them properly. Some of these skills 
are attentive listening, asking questions, paraphrasing, reflecting, explaining, 
checking understanding, summarizing, concreteness, and structuring. Unclear 
verbal or written communication is especially common in connection with 
medications (17).  
 
Quality assurance and monitoring clinical performance 
Donabedian describes what he calls “the components of quality” and places 
“the care provided by physicians and other providers” at the center of the 
components of quality emphasizing its outstanding position in health quality. 
Care provided by physicians and other providers is comprised of interpersonal 
and technical aspects. The interpersonal aspect of care deals with patient-
practitioner relationship and the technical aspect of it is focused on 
practitioners’ knowledge, judgment and skills. The knowledge, judgment, and 
skills of practitioners, and in our case physicians, is one the central themes in 
this paper. 
 
Donabedian states that one may assure the quality of health (quality assurance) 
by monitoring clinical performance and improving it when necessary. The 
necessary steps in this process are as follow: determining what to monitor and 
priorities in monitoring, selecting approach or approaches to assessing 
performance, formulating criteria and standards, obtaining the necessary 
30 
 
information, choosing when to monitor and how to monitor, constructing a 
monitoring system, and bringing about behavior change (18).  
6. Quality indicators 
Quality indicators are surrogates which address the quality issues in an 
organization. There are different kinds of indicators for assessing different 
aspects of performance. For instance, indicators used in ICUs (explained in 
detail further on) may measure medical outcomes (like ICU mortality, hospital 
mortality, and 30 day mortality) or logistic outcomes (like length of stay in the 
ICU and length of stay in the hospital). Indicators may measure elements of 
process quality (like duration of ventilator weaning, off ventilator days, 
medical decision making, and laboratory use). Further, indicators may also 
measure patient and family perceived outcomes (patient satisfaction, family 
satisfaction, and end of life care). There are other indicators measuring among 
others economic outcomes, staff related issues, and managerial variables (16).  
In connection with measuring and evaluating ICU performance we should 
address structures and processes, ICU factors as well as patient factors, and 
bear in mind that focusing exclusively on clinical patient-related factors is not 
sufficient. EURICUS-I, a large multidisciplinary and multicenter study, has 
shown that non-clinical factors, like organisation and management of ICU, do 
influence the clinical outcome of intensive care patients (19).  
 
Quality and safety indicators in ICUs 
In this section the structure quality and safety indicators, process quality and 
safety indicators, and outcome quality and safety indicators in ICU will be 
discussed in detail.  
Structural indicators of quality and safety in ICU, as mentioned above, measure 
aspects of material and human resources, as well as organizational and 
technological resources needed to produce high quality patient care. Structure 
quality and safety indicators may be summarized as below (20-22) : 
I. Organizational structure variable 
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II. Task variables: 
• Availability of protocols 
• Policy to prevent medication errors 
• Policy to register outcome 
III. Team variables: 
• Adequacy of staffing 
• Nurse-to-patient ration 
• Availability of an intensive care practitioner 24 hours a day 
• Pharmacist presence during the ICU rounds 
• Communication or conflicts among teams members 
IV. Institutional variables: 
• Process for nursing staff competencies 
• Presence of period of integration of the new healthcare workers 
• Clear task identification 
• Absenteeism, importance of the personnel turn-over 
The organizational structure of ICU (ICU model) is an important structure 
quality variable which refers to how the human resources in ICU are organized. 
There are three major ICU organizational models; open ICU, closed ICU, and 
those with intensivist co-management. Open ICU is an ICU in which patients are 
admitted under the care of another physician than intensivists. The intensivists 
are available and provide expertise via consultation. Closed ICU is an ICU in 
which patients admitted to the ICU are transferred to the care of an intensivist 
assigned to the ICU on a full-time basis. Generally, patients are accepted to the 
ICU only after evaluation and approval by the intensivist. ICU with intensivist 
co-management is an open ICU in which all patients receive mandatory 
consultation from an intensivist. Other physicians collaborate with intensivists 
in the management of all ICU patients.  According the current evidence, a 
closed intensivist-led model is considered to provide improved outcome at 
reduced costs.  
Process quality and safety indicators in ICU measure the care which is delivered 
in practice with the available resources and evidence based protocols. Process 
quality and safety indicators are especially important when specific 
interventions have been shown to be superior and improve patient care. 
Unfortunately, the number of supported interventions is very limited, even in 
case of ICU-specific conditions like sepsis and acute respiratory distress 
syndrome. This makes it difficult to adopt specific process quality measures as 
markers of quality of care. However there is strong reason to support 
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monitoring processes of care which have been shown to improve the 
performance. Process quality and safety indicators are easiest to use for 
encouraging change and adherence to evidence-based standards of care.  
Examples on the process quality and safety indicators may be:  
I. Mechanical ventilation 
• Semi-recumbent position during mechanical ventilation 
• Overinflation of endotracheal balloon  
II. Sedation 
• Appropriate sedation 
• Screening weaning of mechanical ventilation 
• Procedure of stopping sedation 
• Daily monitoring of sedation 
III. Medication 
• Medication administered to wrong patients 
• Error administering anticoagulant medication 
• Error prescribing anticoagulant medication 
• Error administering vasoactive drugs 
• Error administering insulin  
• Death or serious disability associated with hypoglycaemia  
IV. Intravenous lines  
• Screening of removal of central venous catheter 
V. Management 
• Appropriate use of prophylaxis against gastro-intestinal 
haemorrhage in patients with mechanical ventilation 
• Appropriate use of thromboembolism prophylaxis 
• Appropriate use of early enteral nutrition 
• Early management of severe sepsis and septic shock 
• Surgical intervention in traumatic brain injury with subdural 
and/or epidural brain trauma 
• Monitoring of intracranial pressure in severe traumatic brain injury 
with pathologic CT findings 
• Delay in surgical treatment 
• Change of route of quinolones 
• Screening of MRSA on admission  
• Pain management in unsedated patients 
• Events during ICU transport 
VI. Complications 
• Pneumonia associated with mechanical ventilation 
• Accidental extubation 
• Accidental removal of a central venous catheter 
• Catheter-related bloodstream infections 
• Pneumothorax related to insertion of a central venous catheter 
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• Death or serious disability associated with intravascular air 
embolism 
• Fall 
• Death or serious disability associated with a hemolytic reaction 
due to the administration of ABO-incompatible blood or blood 
products 
• Percentage of infections with resistant organisms (vancomycin-
resistant enterococci, methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus 
• Pressure sores 
 
Outcome indicators measure the consequences of healthcare in terms of 
mortality, complications and sequelae, and quality of care. Examples of 
outcome indicators are: 
I. ICU mortality rate 
II. Hospital mortality rate 
III. Percentage of ICU patients with ICU length of stay more than 7 
days 
IV. Average ICU length of stay 
V. Mean days on mechanical ventilation 
VI. Rate of unplanned re-admissions < 72 hours 
VII. Patient/family satisfaction 
Regarding outcome measures of quality we know that by definition the high 
quality medical care is supposed to result in improved patient outcomes. 
However, outcome research in critical care is challenging. One reason is that 
outcome variables typically relies on observational studies and may be 
influenced by numerous other variables like patient-based variables, disease-
based variables, provider-based variables , therapy-based variables, and other 
variables like socioeconomic variables. Mortality or the probability of death 
measured at a fix point is the most common outcome variable in ICUs. 
Recently, there has been a focus on the effects of critical illness on long-term 
survival and quality of life, but there is insufficient evidence supporting the 
linkage of specific therapies in ICU with these outcomes. Generally there are 
several limitations to use outcomes to measure performance of ICU. The 
outcome measures are usually limited to mortality or length of stay. Risk-
adjusted mortality, which is a more adequate variable, also suffers from lack of 
reliability and validity because of residual confounding and bias due to referral, 
upcoding of severity, and chance. Other outcomes like medical error rates, 
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nosocomial infections, patient and family satisfaction, caregiver burnout, and 
quality of dying are usually not measured routinely (20-22). 
7. Human errors 
Pattern recognition, heuristics, and cognitive biases 
Human error is the most common reason for crash in commercial aviation. The 
same appears to be true in acute care medicine. In the field of engineering 
human errors cannot be prevented by merely organizing the activity on the 
basis of mechanical know-how (skills). There is also a need for a comprehensive 
strategy that in engineering means teaching situational awareness, improved 
communication, appropriate task distribution, and optimal teamwork. In 
aviation these measures collectively are known as Crew Resource Management. 
Physicians, like engineers, need to have an approach for understanding why 
errors occur. This is a field that belongs to cognitive psychology. The 
knowledge on how we humans learn is of great importance in cognitive 
psychology. An important process in human learning is the concept of pattern 
recognition that enables us to see connections between apparently varied 
pieces of information. For instance we consider the diagnosis acute coronary 
syndrome when we meet an aged patient with chest discomfort, 
breathlessness, and arm pain. With increasing experience we learn to identify 
automatically, almost without thinking, according to pattern recognition. The 
drawback is that decision-making without thinking or with minimal thinking can 
result in errors. Pattern recognition is necessary for efficient healthcare but it 
requires that some pieces of information are more emphasized and some others 
less emphasized. Further we usually assume that the most common explanation 
is the correct one. This is the rule of Occam's razor that suggests that the 
simplest solution is usually the correct one (http://en.wikipedia.org: Occam's 
razor). Occam’s razor is a rule of thumb or heuristic that refers to experience-
based techniques that help in problem solving, learning and discovery.  
 
A rule of thumb or heuristic is an educated guess, an intuitive judgment or 
simply common sense. Heuristics, in psychology, refer to simple and efficient 
rules which are either imprinted by evolution or are learned. Heuristics have 
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been proposed to explain problem-solving and decision-making processes for 
instance in case of facing complex problems or when there is incomplete 
information accessible. Heuristics may work sufficiently well under most 
circumstances, but in certain cases lead to systematic errors or cognitive biases 
(http://en.wikipedia.org: Heuristic).  
 
Cognitive biases are developed mental behavior mechanisms. Some of cognitive 
biases are adaptive and have been developed to enable faster decisions when 
faster decisions are of greater value. Others presumably result from a lack of 
appropriate mental mechanisms or from the misapplication of a mechanism 
that is appropriate under different circumstances. A list of several cognitive 
biases is available on Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org: List of cognitive 
biases) (23).  Generally, the way humans perceive themselves and their reality 
is studied by cognitive and behavior sciences which focus on human decision-
making, adoption or rejection of rules and guidelines, and human interaction 
with authorities. Cognitive psychology in contrast to psychoanalysis is based on 
truly scientific methods and concentrates on mental processes including how 
people think, perceive, remember, and learn. Cognitive psychology is 
interested in the ways of acquiring, storing, and processing information and 
researches on among others how to improve memory, how to increase decision-
making accuracy, and how to structure educational activities to enhance 
learning. Research in cognitive psychology has shown a variety of cognitive 
biases that are common to all humans and many of them follow predictable and 
obvious patterns. Some of cognitive biases are as follow: 
Anchoring: relying too heavily on one piece of information when making 
decisions 
Bandwagon effect: doing or believing things because many other people 
do or believe the same things 
Confirmation bias: ignoring the information which does not fit with the 
own beliefs 
Fundamental attribution error: ascribing behavior to personality rather 
than social and environmental factors 
Loss aversion: preferring avoiding losses over acquiring gains 
Omission bias: preferring a more harmful act of omission to a 
potentially less harmful act of commission 
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Projection: assuming that other people think as we do 
Selective perception: where expectations affect perception 
 
Cognitive biases and intentional or non-intentional perception or misperception 
of one’s cognition may be important in linking perception and practice. Then it 
would not be surprising that not everything that is visible will be perceived in 
practice and not all practice that is perceived will be truly visible (24).  
Adverse events and errors 
An adverse event according to Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ) is “any injury caused by medical care. Examples are pneumothorax 
from central venous catheter placement, anaphylaxis to penicillin, 
postoperative wound infection, and hospital-acquired delirium in elderly 
patients. Identifying something as an adverse event does not imply error, 
negligence, or poor quality care. It simply indicates that an undesirable 
clinical outcome resulted from some aspect of diagnosis or therapy, not an 
underlying disease process. Thus, pneumothorax from central venous catheter 
placement counts as an adverse event regardless of insertion technique. 
Similarly, postoperative wound infections count as adverse events even if the 
operation proceeded with optimal adherence to sterile procedures, the patient 
received appropriate antibiotic prophylaxis in the peri-operative setting, and 
so on”. 
Further, AHRQ defines error as “an act of commission (doing something wrong) 
or omission (failing to do the right thing) that leads to an undesirable outcome 
or significant potential for such an outcome. For instance, ordering a 
medication for a patient with a documented allergy to that medication would 
be an act of commission, and failing to prescribe a low-dose unfractionated 
heparin as venous thromboembolism prophylaxis for a patient after hip 
replacement surgery would be an error of omission. Errors of omission are 
more difficult to recognize than errors of commission but likely represent a 
larger problem”. 
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Errors of omission may characterise not-adhering to clinical 
research results 
Omission bias and the closely related status quo bias are well-described 
cognitive biases that result from a preference for omission (inaction) and 
preservation of the status quo. This preference can make decision makers to 
choose the risks and benefits of the status quo even when the relative risks and 
benefits of changing the status quo through action are objectively superior. 
Similarly, decision makers may inappropriately judge harms due to omission as 
less severe or blameable than harms that result from action. Tendencies 
toward omission bias may be reinforced by the clinical dictum “first do no 
harm,” which emphasizes risk avoidance and may serve as a justification for 
“doing nothing” or “holding course”. In general, critical care decisions are 
susceptible to the influence of omission and status quo bias (25). 
 
Although no one would question that obvious errors of commission must be 
prevented whenever possible, errors of omission constitute a far greater safety 
risk. Errors of omission are more widespread and more difficult to identify. For 
example, consider the burden of illness related to central venous 
catheterisation. More than five million patients in the USA have central venous 
catheters inserted every year. About 15% of patients have complications of the 
procedure, some of which have the potential for serious harm. Accordingly, 
optimal management of the central venous catheter should be a major safety 
priority. Although several effective and affordable catheter strategies do exist 
for decreasing catheter complications, the application of these strategies is 
probably inadequate (26). 
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8. Patient safety 
Background 
Safety refers to reduction of risk.  Patient safety, as illustrated in the table 2, 
is a dimension of quality. According to Institute of Medicine patient safety is 
“freedom from accidental injury due to medical care, or medical errors”. 
Patient safety has increasingly been regarded as the key element of quality in 
the last two decades (12). The process began with Harvard Medical Practice 
study in 1991 that showed that adverse events occurred in 3.7% of 
hospitalizations and errors could be related to 27.6% of adverse events (27;28). 
In 2000 Institute of Medicine published its extremely influential study “To err is 
human: building a safer health system”(29). This study estimated that 
preventable medical errors are responsible for between 44 000 and 98 000 
deaths annually in United States. Subsequently the English National Health 
Service (NHS) published its pioneering report “An organisation with a memory”. 
This report estimated that each year 85 000 patients (10% of admissions to NHS 
hospitals) were affected and harmed by adverse events (12). Harm is happening 
to one in six hospitalized patients in the developed countries, most of them 
preventable. The rate of harm is much higher in developing countries. In 
Europe 8 % to 12 % of hospitalized patients experience care-related harm or 
injury. Patients admitted into ICU are more at risk of harm, partly because of 
the illness itself and partly because of high complexity and multiple performed 
interventions in an ICU (30). Lack of patient safety measures make the care 
unsafe and produce opportunities for medical errors to occur (31).  
Vocabulary 
The project “Safety Improvement for Patients in Europe” (SIMPATIE) was one 
the European Commission’s efforts for improvement of safety in healthcare 
(http://www.simpatie.org). It started in 2005 and was planned to run for two years. 
The objective of SIMPATIE was “to establish a common European set of 
vocabulary, indicators, internal and external instruments for improvement of 
safety in healthcare”. The project was divided into 8 “work packages” where 
work package 4 was ”Vocabulary & Indicators”. The aim of this work package 
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was to formulate “a set of definitions and a set of system and organization 
indicators / outcome measures related to patient safety”.  The project leaders 
stated “We strongly recommend the vocabulary and vocabulary framework to 
be made accessible in the European countries. It should be translated into the 
European languages using a standardized method and adequate 
implementation strategies developed; health-care organizations, professional 
and academic bodies and educational institutions should be made aware of the 
existence of the vocabulary, be encouraged to use it as suggested so that the 
key elements can be put into everyday practice”. 
The vocabulary was constructed by 24 patient safety terms covering four 
domains of “detection of risks”, “analysis of risks”, “resulting actions” and 
“failure mode”. There is a reprint of this vocabulary in appendix 1. 
The project leaders further explained that the vocabulary was neither 
taxonomy nor a classification of adverse events, and referred readers to World 
Health Organization (WHO) for such works. International Classification for 
Patient Safety (ICPS) (http://www.who.int/patientsafety/taxonomy/en/) is a part of 
WHO Patient Safety programs. ICPS provides a list of preferred terms and 
definitions for key concepts that is reprinted below. See appendix 2 for ICPS 
definitions. WHO explains that ICPS is not a classification but only a conceptual 
framework for an international classification representing a consensus of 
international experts on a reasonable understanding of patient safety. 
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9. Evidence-based medicine (EBM) 
What is EBM? 
In November and December 1993, the “Evidence-Based Medicine Working 
Group” published two papers in JAMA (Journal of American Medical Association) 
entitled “Users' Guides to the Medical Literature” (32;33). This was an official 
introduction of EBM to the public.  
EBM is not a modern unique event in medical history. Many empiricist, 
epistemic, and scientific doctors have practiced it during the last 1000 years 
and managed to improve the quality of care through careful assessment of the 
available evidence. Rangachari in his paper from 1997 called EBM as “old 
French wine with a new Canadian label” (34) and illustrated Pierre Louis’ 
experimental approach with bloodletting in different clinical scenarios in the 
first half of nineteenth century as an example. The clash between the followers 
of Louis’ empirical approach versus the Gnostic clinicians’ approach looking to 
the individual and human variability has exactly been mirrored in the papers 
from the 1990s. Philosophically EBM is simply the extension of Newton’s and 
Descartes’ ideas on the importance of observation, method, order, and pattern 
to exclusion of individuality (2).  Hence, the philosophical origins of the modern 
EBM extend back to the middle of 19th century Paris and earlier (35). EBM was 
defined by Rosenberg in 1995 as the process of systematically reviewing, 
appraising and using clinical research findings to aid the delivery of optimum 
clinical care to patients (36). In 1996 David Sackett defined EBM as: 
“Evidence based medicine is the conscientious, explicit, and judicious 
use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of 
individual patients. The practice of evidence based medicine means 
integrating individual clinical expertise with the best available external 
clinical evidence from systematic research. By individual clinical 
expertise we mean the proficiency and judgment that individual 
clinicians acquire through clinical experience and clinical practice. 
Increased expertise is reflected in many ways, but especially in more 
effective and efficient diagnosis and in the more thoughtful 
identification and compassionate use of individual patients' 
predicaments, rights, and preferences in making clinical decisions about 
their care. By best available external clinical evidence we mean 
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clinically relevant research, often from the basic sciences of medicine, 
but especially from patient centered clinical research into the accuracy 
and precision of diagnostic tests (including the clinical examination), 
the power of prognostic markers, and the efficacy and safety 
of therapeutic, rehabilitative, and preventive regimens. External clinical 
evidence both invalidates previously accepted diagnostic tests and 
treatments and replaces them with new ones that are more powerful, 
more accurate, more efficacious, and safer. Good doctors use both 
individual clinical expertise and the best available external 
evidence, and neither alone is enough” (35). 
The definition given by Sackett is a clinician’s definition of EBM where the 
elements of “conscientious, explicit and judicious” are markers of clinical 
expertise and “individual patient” is placed at the center. Another definition, 
made by Appleby, may be regarded as a manager’s definition: “the rigorous 
evaluation of the effectiveness of healthcare interventions, common 
dissemination of the results of the evaluation and the use of the finding s to 
influence clinical practice”.  
Some of the new trends in EBM are as follow 
• The process of assessing the evidence has become more systematic and 
statistical and in the hands of the statisticians rather than clinicians. 
• The results of the analysis are deliberately refined into clinical 
guidelines. 
• Advances in information technology have allowed easier dissemination of 
the conclusions. 
• The process has also looked at structural issues such as whether a higher 
flow of patients with a specific disease through a unit will produce 
better results (2). 
Some of the shortcomings 
Some criticisms of EBM are unjust and based on misunderstanding of what it is. 
Examples are accusing EBM of being a “cook-book” and disregarding the 
“individual patient” and “clinical expertise”. However, there are other 
criticisms which illustrate some limitations of EBM. One such criticism is the 
quality of evidence. The quality of evidence in EBM may be exceptionally good, 
but there is also a risk of publication bias favoring interventional studies and 
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those studies with positive results while disfavoring studies with negative 
results and qualitative studies. But this limitation is not restricted to the EBM 
and generally all use of research results bear some degree of risk for 
publication bias. Another criticism is with respect to meta-analysis which is the 
most accepted form of summarizing studies. Meta-analysis may include and 
compare divergent and incompatible studies to be able to conclude in a pre-
determined manner. There is no statistical way of resolving the problem of 
heterogeneity; hence meta-analyses should present their results with utmost 
carefulness. This carefulness should not be restricted to the results but should 
also cover the whole process of meta-analysis and generation of guidelines. The 
rule should be that the same studies should result in identical or very similar 
meta-analyses and guidelines when different panels of experts perform the 
process. However, guidelines are needed despite their shortcomings. They are 
needed because of their role in improving the quality of care. They are also 
needed because doctors not only may not know what is current best treatment, 
but may not know that they don’t know (2). 
Gap between research findings and clinical practice 
There is no guarantee that reliable evidence leads to better decisions. It is also 
difficult to evaluate the claims that EBM offers an improved method of decision 
making. There are many factors that influence medical decision making 
including knowledge and scientific evidence, personal experience, personal 
biases and values, economic and political considerations, and ethical principles 
like concern for justice. How clinicians integrate these factors into a final 
decision is not always clear (37). One of the most consistent findings in 
healthcare research is the gap between best practice, determined by scientific 
evidence, and the actual clinical care. Studies in united states and the 
Nederland suggest that at least 30%-40% of patients do not receive care 
according to current scientific evidence and 20%-25% of the care provided is not 
needed or potentially harmful to patients (38). To provide the best care, 
clinicians should be aware of the results of clinical research and implement 
them into clinical practice.  
 
In the past decades different approaches have been used to improve clinical 
practice. One of these approaches has been evidence-based clinical practice 
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guidelines which appear to be one of the most effective tools for improving the 
quality of care. Evidence-based clinical practice guidelines generate concrete 
recommendations to help caregivers providing appropriate care, promote 
improvement of care processes, reduce unwanted variation, and perhaps help 
contain costs (39). High quality healthcare needs practice which is consistent 
with the best evidence (40). Already in 1993, Tony Delamothe, the deputy 
editor of British Medical Journal, wrote “imagine a world where every patient 
received the best known treatment” and added that “ignorance, 
incompetence, poor management, and a sometimes deliberate disregard of 
established knowledge all get in the way of best practice” (41). The gap 
between research findings and clinical practice is not a new phenomenon and 
has been extendedly discussed in the literature. Physicians’ behaviour has been 
recognized as one of the key elements in sustaining this gap (42;43). Writing 
practice guidelines is an attempt to correct deviations from recommended 
medical practice, but the problem remains since the guidelines are not fully 
implemented (44). Expectedly, there has been a great deal of effort to 
understand why physicians do not follow clinical practice guidelines (45),  how 
to disseminate evidence effectively (46), and how to change provider behaviour 
(47). 
Dissemination of evidence 
Lack of awareness, lack of familiarity, lack of agreement, lack of self-efficacy 
(i.e., the belief in one’s ability to perform a behaviour), low expectancy of 
favourable outcomes, inertia and lack of motivation, as well as perceived 
external barriers beyond the control of individuals have been identified as 
significant barriers for physicians to adhere to guidelines. Lack of awareness, 
motivation, and perceived external factors have been distinguished as 
particularly important barriers.  
How should the clinical research evidence be disseminated and how should the 
physicians be convinced to follow them? There are at least 6 models of 
evidence dissemination described below (45). It seems that no single model of 
dissemination of evidence is capable alone to fill the gap between evidence and 
clinical practice.  
  
Six models of evidence dissemination: 
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1- Evidence speaks for itself: It implies that evidence disseminates 
automatically and consequently changes the clinical practice due to its power. 
With a couple of exceptions, this model is unsuccessful and in fact browsing 
journals (with the problems of critically appraising individual trials), attending 
conferences, and listening to didactic lectures (traditional forms of continuing 
medical education) has little impact on changing practice. 
2- Evidence as a ”ready-to-go” package of knowledge: This implies packages 
of high quality evidence with clear and brief bottom lines like meta-analyses, 
systematic reviews, and practice guidelines which are developed by 
authoritative groups. Ready-to-go packages have caused the problem of 
assessing the integrity of these secondary sources of knowledge and have not 
gained much adherence. 
3- Evidence as an industrial object: This industrial approach implies the whole 
field of educational outreach, case reviews by peers, audit and feedback, 
reminder systems, and clinician decision aids as well as multiple administrative 
tools and financial incentives. This resource consuming approach, despite 
important effects in some areas, did not fulfil its initial promise and only 
increased the proportions of patients receiving optimal care from 6% up to 13%. 
Additionally physicians felt a sense of loss in autonomy and decision-making. 
4- Evidence within a framework of electronic information systems: Here 
computers were supposed to assist in knowledge retrieval and provide 
automated alerts and prompts. Artificial intelligent systems were to be 
constructed able to analyse, interpret, anticipate, and advise. However, there 
has been a great distance between the prototypes and the ordinary clinical and 
everyday systems. It became clear that the cognitive psychodynamics, 
technical reliability, and sociological impacts of human-machine interfaces 
were more problematic than anticipated. 
5- Evidence within a framework of social innovation: In this model, changing 
clinical practice with respect to new evidence is seen as a form of social 
innovation.  
6- Evidence as common property in need of a common language: Enabling 
and authorizing non-clinicians (e.g. patients, patient organizations, healthcare 
administrators and policy makers) to become more aware of and advocate for 
evidence-based care. Clinicians may need to leave behind their traditionally 
absolute management of implementing new medical discoveries and accept the 
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role of certain groups of non-clinicians. Adopting a more universal language of 
benefit and harm may promote a more common ownership of evidence (45).  
Changing practice; barriers, attitudes and invisible factors 
With respect to clinicians’ non-adherence to recommended guidelines, the first 
hindrance is the basic problems with the proposed practice changes. However 
there are other kinds of hindrances like the clinicians’ barriers (impaired 
knowledge, attitudes, and skills), the invisible influences of opinion leaders, 
group psychology, influence of peers, social marketing, organisational 
characteristics, and economic factors (46) .  
One may classify the influencing factors to predisposing factors (like knowledge 
and attitudes of the clinicians), enabling factors (like capacity and resources) 
and reinforcing factors (like opinions and behaviours of others).  
 
Clinicians’ desire to achieve recognition within a social group of like-minded 
people, belonging to and identifying with them, is an important determinant of 
clinicians’ attitude. This aspect of clinicians’ behaviour has been overlooked 
previously. The social environment of healthcare professionals is governed by 
norms and customs. These norms may be spoken and clear or unspoken and 
hidden, and may create morally desirable or undesirable behaviours. Clinician’s 
behaviour is determined by combination of several elements like rational 
thoughts, profession-based and profession-determined cognition and attitude, 
and organisational and socio-political factors. Changing practice involves a 
complex social learning process. The first step of evidence implementation 
should perhaps be knowledge acquisition on determinants of the clinician’s 
behaviour. The next step is recognition that barriers to guideline adherence 
include not only individual factors, but also social and organizational factors, 
each constituted by several different variables.   
Individual factors (innovation factors [the perceived advantages of innovation 
in practice and its feasibility, credibility, accessibility, and attractiveness], 
cognitive, awareness, educational, attitudinal, motivational, and self-efficacy) 
Social factors (social learning, social network and influence, patient influence, 
and leadership) 
Organisational and economic factors (innovativeness of organisation, quality 
management, complexity, organisational learning, and the economics) (46).  
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This short description of the barriers and their dynamics that determine the 
implementation of evidence illustrates the complex and inter-reacting nature 
of them. There is a need for deeper understanding of the barriers to and 
incentives for achieving change to bridge the gap between scientific evidence 
and practice. Below it has been illustrated a typical model of change.  
 
Important change factors related to individual professionals:  
 Cognitive (mechanisms of thinking and deciding; balancing 
benefits and risks) 
 Educational (individual learning needs and styles) 
 Attitudinal (attitudes, perceived behavioural control, self-
efficacy, social norms) 
 Motivational (different motivational stages with different 
factors/barriers) 
Important factors related to social context: 
 Social learning (incentives, feedback, reinforcement, observed 
behaviour of role models) 
 Social network and influence (existing values and culture of 
network, opinion of key people) 
 Patient influence (perceived patient expectations and behaviour 
 Leadership (leadership style, type of power, commitment of 
leader) 
Important factors related to organisational and economic context: 
 Innovativeness of organisation (extent of specialisation, 
decentralisation, professionalization, functional differentiation) 
 Quality management (culture, leadership, organisation of 
processes, customer focus) 
 Complexity (interactions between parts of a complex system, 
behavioural patterns) 
 Organisational learning (capacity and arrangements for 
continuous learning in organisation 
 Economics (reimbursement arrangements, rewards, incentives) 
 
Healthcare professionals work in specific social, organisational, and structural 
settings involving different factors at different levels supporting or opposing 
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the change. Research has shown that failure to implement evidence involves 
factors at different levels including characteristics of professionals and 
patients, team functioning, influence of colleagues, organisation of care 
processes, available resources (like time and staffing), policymaking, and 
leadership. There are change models that focus on individual professionals and 
aim to make change in their behaviour. This may occur by promoting awareness 
of innovation, stimulating interest and involvement, creating understanding, 
developing insight into own routines, developing positive attitude to change, 
creating positive intentions and decision to change, trying out change in 
practice, confirming the value of change and its side effects, integrating new 
practice into routines, and lastly embedding new practice in organisation (48). 
Barriers to change need to be identified in different healthcare settings to be 
able to plan and apply a tailored intervention. It has been shown, for more than 
a decade ago, that tailored interventions can change professional practice (49).  
10. Strategic management in quality and safety 
The last sections dealt with both “do things right” (efficiency) and “do the 
right things” (effectiveness). “Insert central venous catheter correctly” 
(according to the guidelines) is an example of “do things right” (efficiency). 
“Insert central venous catheters only when it is necessary” is an example of “do 
the right things” (effectiveness). We discussed the need of filling the gap 
between research and practice with respect to efficiency and effectiveness. 
Further, we should remember that if we do wrong things (lack of 
effectiveness), but perform them well (acceptable or good efficiency), we may 
measure our performance and easily be impressed by ourselves despite doing 
wrong things. 
These two concepts apply not only for clinical success and in care of individual 
patients but also in organizational success. In fact, effectiveness and efficiency 
are of vital importance for strategic management, a managerial responsibility 
for instance at a micro-system level like ICU. Effectiveness has an external 
orientation and assesses if the organization is well positioned to fulfil its 
mission and vision. Efficiency, on the other hand, has an internal orientation 
and assesses the right use of capital, personnel, and other resources.  
 
48 
 
It is important to remember that if an organization is doing wrong things 
(lacking effectiveness), no amount of efficiency will save it from downfall. With 
economic pressure on healthcare organizations a great deal of emphasis has 
been placed on efficiency, but effectiveness is the primary and we should 
understand what we should be doing. Effectiveness requires learning and 
change but the demands of performance inhibit learning and change (4). 
Strategic managers should carefully balance the requirements of efficiency and 
performance with the necessities of effectiveness, learning, and doing the right 
thing. 
11. Patient safety in ICU 
“Making Healthcare Safer: A Critical Analysis of Patient Safety Practices”, a 
large piece of patient safety work, was published in July 2001. This report that 
accomplished by the "Stanford University Evidence-based Practice Center” was 
an evidence-based review of patient safety with a special focus on hospital 
activities. It was a mission from Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ) that belongs to "U.S. Department of Health and Human Services”. In 
this 672 pages review “patient safety practices" is defined as ”a type of process 
or structure whose application reduces the probability of adverse events 
resulting from exposure to the healthcare system across a range of diseases and 
procedures”. This definition was based on the concept that a system approach 
(process or structure) for patient safety would be a much more efficient 
approach than an approach focused on personnel and person penalty. In the 
review the authors examined the usefulness of 79 different patient safety 
measures and described them in 45 chapters. Each chapter contained a 
standardized structure with the following components: background, practice 
description, prevalence and severity of the target safety problem, 
opportunities for impact, study designs and outcomes, evidence for 
effectiveness of the practice, potential for harm, costs and implementation, 
and comment. The purpose of analyzing each of these patient safety practices 
was to try to answer two questions. The first question was whether evidence 
supports the implementation of a specific practice to improve patient safety, 
and the second question was whether evidence supports the need for more 
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research on the measure discussed. In this comprehensive review, the sections 
and chapters with direct relevance for intensive care units are as follow: 
 
Section A. Adverse Drug Events (ADEs) 
Chapter 6. Computerized Physician Order Entry (CPOE) with Clinical Decision  
 Support Systems (CDSSs) 
Chapter 7. The Clinical Pharmacist’s Role in Preventing Adverse Drug Events 
Chapter 8. Computer Adverse Drug Event (ADE) Detection and Alerts 
Chapter 9. Protocols for High-Risk Drugs: Reducing Adverse Drug Events  
 Related to Anticoagulants 
Chapter 10. Unit-Dose Drug Distribution Systems 
Chapter 11. Automated Medication Dispensing Devices 
 
Section B. Infection Control 
Chapter 12. Practices to Improve Handwashing Compliance 
Chapter 13. Impact of Barrier Precautions in Reducing the Transmission of Serious  
 Nosocomial Infections 
Chapter 14. Impact of Changes in Antibiotic Use Practices on Nosocomial  
 Infections and Antimicrobial Resistance – Clostridium Difficile and  
 Vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE) 
Chapter 15. Prevention of Nosocomial Urinary Tract Infections 
Chapter 16. Prevention of Intravascular Catheter-Associated Infections 
Chapter 17. Prevention of Ventilator-Associated Pneumonia 
 
Section C. Surgery, Anesthesia, and Perioperative Medicine 
Chapter 18. Localizing Care to High-Volume Centers 
Chapter 20. Prevention of Surgical Site Infections 
Chapter 21. Ultrasound Guidance of Central Vein Catheterization 
Chapter 26. Prevention of Falls in Hospitalized and Institutionalized Older People 
Chapter 28. Prevention of Delirium in Older Hospitalized Patients 
 
Section E. General Clinical Topics 
Chapter 31. Prevention of Venous Thromboembolism 
Chapter 32. Prevention of Contrast-Induced Nephropathy 
Chapter 33. Nutritional Support 
Chapter 34. Prevention of Clinically Significant Gastrointestinal Bleeding in 
Intensive Care Unit Patients 
Chapter 37. Pain Management 
 
Section F. Organization, Structure, and Culture 
Chapter 38. “Closed” Intensive Care Units and Other Models of Care for Critically  
 Ill Patients 
Chapter 39. Nurse Staffing, Models of Care Delivery, and Interventions 
Chapter 40. Promoting a Culture of Safety 
 
Section G. Systems Issues and Human Factors 
Chapter 41. Human Factors and Medical Devices 
Chapter 42. Information Transfer 
Chapter 45. Simulator-Based Training and Patient Safety 
Chapter 46. Fatigue, Sleepiness, and Medical Errors 
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Chapter 47. Safety During Transport of Critically Ill Patients 
 
Section H. Role of the Patient 
Chapter 48. Procedures For Obtaining Informed Consent 
Chapter 49. Advance Planning For End-of-Life Care 
 
In an intensive care unit there are many factors which influence patient safety 
including organizational characteristics, physician staffing, nurse-staffing 
levels, nurse-to-patient ratio, collaboration between nurses and physicians, 
transmission of information between nurses, critical care pharmacists and 
their participation on physician rounds, inadequate empirical antimicrobial 
therapy, and volume of work. Other influential factors are volume/outcome 
and workload/infection relationships, well-being of intensive care nurses as 
well as human errors (50-65).  
 
Sociedad Española de Medicina Intensiva Crítica y Unidades Coronarias 
(SEMISYUS) (www.semicyuc.org) in its publication from 2005 “Quality indicators in 
critically ill patients” (66) listed 120 quality indicators for intensive care units; 
among others “Incidence of barotrauma” (indicator number 13) and “Low tidal 
volume during invasive mechanical ventilation in acute lung injury (indicator 
number 26). Further, SEMISYUS considers the existence of basic protocols as a 
quality indicator (quality indicator number 117). The list of these basic 
protocols which should at least include evaluation, diagnosis, treatment, and 
healthcare circuits used are as follow:  
1. Criteria for admission and discharge 
2. Acute coronary syndrome  
3. Management of severe arrhythmias and heart block  
4. Traumatic brain injury 
5. Sedation and pain management 
6. Invasive and noninvasive mechanical ventilation and weaning  
7. Severe sepsis and diagnosis of infections in general  
8. Withholding and withdrawing life support 
9. Appropriate end-of-life care 
10. Use of restraints 
11. Enteral and parenteral nutrition  
12. Dialysis 
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13. Brain death 
14. Acute respiratory distress syndrome  
15. Life support 
16. Prophylaxis against upper-gastrointestinal bleeding  
17. Prophylaxis against deep vein thrombosis  
The protocols generally should be updated in a period of 3 to 5 years, and 
those protocols belonging to the services not provided by the intensive care 
department should be excluded from the list above. 
12. Demand for safer care 
There is a demand for patient safety from all stakeholders involved in patient 
care, i.e. governmental agencies, medical societies, physicians, patients, and 
healthcare payers (67-72). The Swedish Medical Association (SMA) began a 
patient safety project in 2008 that lasted two years and was completed at the 
end of 2009. Chairman of the Swedish Medical Association summarized in 
“Läkartidningen” (the organ of SMA) the experiences of this project in an 
article entitled “The work environment affects patient safety” (published in 
the April 13.th 2010 issue). SMA began this project with a survey on “what is 
most important for a patient safe healthcare”.  Over a thousand of physicians 
responded to the survey and the answers could be summed up in four problem 
areas: competency, time, personnel resources and procedures. This means that 
physicians pointed out continuous medical education (competency) and 
structural deficiencies in healthcare organizations (time, personnel resources 
and procedures) as problem areas. The dynamic relationship between these two 
factors is apparent; without competent personnel the most suitable 
organizational structures would be worthless, and without suitable 
organizational structures even most competent personnel are unable to deliver 
safe healthcare.  
 
Accordingly, there are two different broad approaches in achieving safer care; 
the hospital and/or ward approach targeting the system (organizational 
structure and process), and the individual (professional) approach. Probably the 
combination of these approaches would be the most optimal one.  
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Accreditation; a system-based approach for patient safety 
Accreditation is a process in which certification of competency, authority, or 
credibility is presented. Certification refers to the confirmation of certain 
characteristics of an object, person, or organization (Wikipedia).  
A common type of certification is professional certification, certifying a person 
being able to competently complete a job or task. This is usually performed by 
passing of an examination. Certification may be valid for lifetime or need to be 
revaluated after a certain period of time (recertification).  
The goal of certification of hospitals and/or wards is system optimization and 
achieving a higher level of accountability, quality, and patient safety. 
However, certification itself does not guarantee any quality of end products 
and services; it only indicates that the formalized processes are being applied. 
It should be remembered that patient safety in some circumstances may be 
deficient even in certified healthcare organizations. Further, there are some 
vital organization structure aspects that hardly can be subjected to an 
accreditation process and certified, like the way of exerting leadership. It is 
important to stress that principally the ultimate responsibility for patient 
safety lies with the leader of organization, and existence or lack of 
certification does not change it.   
Many physicians are skeptical to the notion that accreditation processes and 
certification of wards and hospitals are for achieving higher levels of quality 
and patient safety. Research is limited and there is no compelling evidence 
about the effect of hospital accreditations on the level of quality of care (73). 
However, accreditation is gaining popularity and there is a tendency for move 
towards constructing evidence of its effects (74). Danish hospitals are fully 
engaged in implementing “The Danish Quality Model” (DDKM) by “Institute for 
Quality and Accreditation in Public Health” or IKAS (http://www.ikas.dk/). DDKM is 
meant to promote collaboration between sectors, create better and more 
coherent patient flow, prevent errors that cost (quality of) lives and resources, 
provide continuous quality development, involve and use the knowledge gained 
through research and experience, and document and highlight the quality of 
healthcare. DDKM is based on accreditation where a set of quality standards 
(“accreditation standards”) is developed.  All institutions are obliged to meet 
these standards. Accreditation standards require that each institution has 
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written guidelines for a wide range of important areas for patient safety and 
that healthcare professionals know these guidelines and work according to 
them. Further, institutions should regularly follow up and perform quality 
control to allow professionals to learn from their mistakes and their successes 
(https://www.sundhed.dk/Artikel.aspx?id=71619.1).  
Service quality, audit, and transparency 
The dimensions of healthcare service quality may be summarized to the 
following three ones; client quality, professional quality, and management 
quality.  Client quality is what clients and practitioners craving from the the 
healthcare service. Professional quality is whether the service meets the needs 
and performs necessary techniques and procedures. Management quality is 
whether resources are used in a most efficient and productive way, within 
limits and directives set by higher authorities. 
 
Professional audit is one of the main approaches of improving professional 
quality. Audit has been defined as “an evaluation of a person, organization, 
system, process, enterprise, project or product. Audits are performed to 
ascertain the validity and reliability of information; also to provide an 
assessment of a system's internal control. The goal of an audit is to express an 
opinion on the person / organization/system (etc) in question, under 
evaluation based on work done on a test basis” (http://en.wikipedia.org).  
There are four main types of medical audit; internal retrospective, external 
retrospective, concurrent active, and criterion-based audit. The terms are self-
describing. Performing audit needs the establishment of structures and 
processes for dealing with inter-professional issues. One should select a method 
of audit that is suited to circumstances of a specific group of professionals. The 
group should be provided necessary resources for the audit to become 
meaningful. Management should have an interest in audit processes and 
outcomes and “market” the need for audit and ask different groups for 
proposals. Management should determine the progress targets and receive 
regular reports to review the cost effectiveness of chosen audit method in each 
professional group to ensure that the audit links with other quality initiatives 
are suitable (75).  
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Audit and transparency are two very central concepts of quality. It should be 
mentioned that both these concepts have been subject to criticism (76;77). The 
main reason for the criticisms has been the fear that audit, control, and 
ultimately transparency would be punched in every single aspect of the modern 
society, building a “big brother society”. Lastly, the method called “audit and 
feedback” is a means of learning (both individual learning and collective or 
organisational learning) and aims to improve practice (78).  
CME/CPD; an individual-based approach for patient safety 
“Continuing medical education” (CME) may be defined as: “a distinct and 
definable activity that supports the professional development of physicians 
and leads to improved patient outcomes. It encompasses all of the learning 
experiences that physicians engage in with the conscious intent of regularly 
and continually improving their performance of professional duties and 
responsibilities” (79). The optimized and developed form of CME is “continuing 
professional development” (CPD). CPD combines the organizational and system 
factors with self-directed learning and personal development. It covers also 
other broader aspects of medicine like practice management and ethical 
decision-making. CPD may be considered as an umbrella for all kinds of 
interventions, and not just traditional conferences and mailed materials. CPD 
more easily includes other learning formats such as reminders, audit and 
feedback, academic detailing, and Web-based guidelines (80). CPD is supposed 
to occur as near as possible to the practice in contrast to CME which usually is 
associated with lecture halls and conference rooms long away from the 
practice. CPD uses the knowledge of how adults learn, that is teacher 
independent learning and learning by doing. CME may be illustrated as a three 
dimensional concept where “content”, “setting”, and “format” make the 
dimensions. Based on this concept, CPD should be regarded as an extension of 
these three CME dimensions, where the dimension of “content” extends from 
clinical (CME) to holistic (CPD), the dimension of “setting” extends from 
educational (CME) to practice (CPD), and the dimension of “format” which 
extends from lecture (CME) to practice based (CPD) (80).  
With respect to CPD, there is a consensus statement entitled “CPD – Improving 
healthcare quality, Ensuring patient safety” from 2006. This consensus 
statement (http://cpme.dyndns.org:591/Adopted/2006/CPDdeclaration.pdf) 
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was the result of a European conference entitled “Continuing Professional 
Development (CPD) – Improving Healthcare”. The Standing Committee of 
European Doctors, also called Comité Permanent des Médecins Européens 
(CPME), which is the body of medical profession in European level, participated 
in this conference. Besides physicians there were also others representatives 
from national authorities, patients’ organizations, and EU institutions. The 
conference was held with the EU Presidency and the European Commission 
protection. The consensus statement was supported strongly by both EU 
Presidency and the European Commission.  The two important aspects of this 
consensus statement were the followings. Firstly the consensus statement 
imprinted the concept of quality as a concept belonging to medical profession 
and as a component for improving healthcare and ensuring patient safety. 
Secondly the consensus statement initiated the opportunity for cooperation 
between the medical profession (CPME in this case) and the governmental 
authorities. The pressure of European public opinion and the public’s demand 
for cooperation between these two bodies, for improving quality and patient 
safety, had probably exerted an influential role in creation of this consensus 
statement. With respect to CPD, CPME, and patient safety there is another 
document known as “Luxembourg declaration on patient safety” from 2005. 
These important documents have been adopted by many national medical 
profession organizations or have influenced them profoundly. These two 
important documents are reprinted in appendices 3 and 4.  
The quality of care is one of the CPME’s concerns: “CPME aims to promote the 
highest standards of medical training and medical practice in order to achieve 
the highest quality of healthcare for all patients in Europe”. “To achieve its 
goals, CPME cooperates proactively with the Institutions of the European 
Union....” (http://www.cpme.be/index.php). These formulations imply a feeling of 
democratic liberalism in contrast to for instance “WMA Declaration of Madrid” 
(discussed previously in this paper) with frequent use of phrases like “right to 
treat patients without interference”, “high degree of professional autonomy”, 
“clinical independence”, “legitimate system of professionally-led regulation”, 
“without undue outside influence” and “threats to professionally-led 
regulation”. It seems that there are two completely different professional 
identities behind these formulations where autonomy/independence is placed 
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opposite to cooperation, and right to treat patients without interference 
opposite to highest quality of healthcare.  
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Regarding CME and CPD, according to the booklet printed by Swedish Medical 
Association (http://www.slf.se/upload/3128/fortbildning_webb.pdf) CPME and Union 
Europénnes des Médécins Specialists (UEMS) agree in general on the principles 
which should be applied to CME and CPD. They agree that CME is a fundamental 
right of every physician, and a responsibility of the profession to meet it and 
investigate the quality of it. They agree also that quality assurance of the 
individual physician’s CME activities is best performed through a systematic 
documentation based on a collegial dialogue. CPME and UEMS do not accept 
compulsory CME points as an adequate method of identifying the physicians’ 
competency and mean that the funding of CME should be an integral part of 
healthcare service costs.  
Anyhow, it should be stressed that CME/CPD educational activities are 
prerequisites to improving quality and patient safety. They constitute a solid 
platform where a safer healthcare should be placed on. Hence, there is a great 
deal of overlapping with respect to CME/CPD educational activities and quality 
improvement and patient safety measures. These are comprised of mails and 
printed materials, lectures and conferences, incident reporting, root cause 
analysis, computerized physician order entry, clinical decision support systems, 
reminder systems, practice guidelines, critical pathways, opinion leaders, 
academic detailing, audit and feedback, certification and recertification, and 
lastly regulation and revalidation. CME/CPD educational activities and quality 
improvement and patient safety measures involve not only physicians but also 
patients and patient organizations, taxpayers, governments, payers, and other 
managerial organizations.  
13. Public demand for accountability versus 
autonomy 
 “Good Doctors, Safer Patients” was a report printed by the United Kingdom 
Department of Health in July 2006 (http://www.dh.gov.uk). The aim of the report 
was “to create a new approach to promoting and assuring good medical 
practice and protecting patients from bad practice”. The report that was a 
comprehensive survey of circumstances regarding patient safety and quality of 
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care in UK contained 44 detailed recommendations and proposed specific 
measures to protect patients from harm. A part of these recommendations are 
reprinted in appendix 5.  
The report stressed that poor practice is a reality despite the fact that the vast 
majority of physicians practice a very high quality medicine. A small proportion 
of physicians practice at an unacceptable standard which can be due to 
inadequate training, insufficient support, ill health, lack of motivation, or in 
rare occasions malice, like the case of Harold Shipman, a general practitioner 
who killed about 250 of his patients during 1972 and 1998 mostly by overdose of 
narcotic drugs. In fact the case of Shipman that led to the Shipman inquiry and 
three other similar inquiries were strong reasons for work resulting to this 
report where the opinion of public and other stakeholders demanded a radical 
change. One of the suggested measures in this report was the necessity of 
introduction of a process of regular physician assessment. The system of 
medical regulation was revised in the 1970s in UK following a crisis of 
confidence in the General Medical Council. The new system was however, still 
firmly based on the principle of self-regulation. While the credibility and 
trustworthiness of medical self-regulation had been eroded by the above-
mentioned high-profile medical scandals, the Bristol inquiry, the inquiry into 
the failures of the Bristol children’s heart surgery service, exploded it.  
Regulation and revalidation in safety-critical industries 
Regulation in medicine may be compared by regulation in other safety-critical 
industries like nuclear, offshore oil, and civil aviation industries that have 
continuously responded properly to their incidents and have built systems of 
quality assurance. When a physician achieves independent practice (like a 
consultant) there is no further formal assessment of knowledge, competence, 
clinical skills or performance until he or she retires while a pilot would be 
assessed about 100 times over the same period.  
Pilots, oil installation managers, and nuclear power plant desk operators are all 
regulated. Practitioners are regularly assessed against demanding and objective 
standards and failure is greeted by corrective action, not sarcasm or guilt. 
Practitioners are proud of their license to practice and employers appreciate 
the role of regulation in the wider quality improvement agenda. The striking 
fact is that in other high-risk industries the burden is on the professional being 
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regulated (like pilots) to prove their competence. In medicine it is the 
responsibility of the regulator to disprove the practitioner’s competence that is 
considered quite extraordinary by for instance pilots.   
The medical regulation has traditionally been synonymous with “self-
regulation”. This is a typical feature of the traditional professionalism where 
the profession owns knowledge and skills and decides the way of providing 
them to the members.  
Disintegration of pure self-regulation in UK 
In UK medicine occupied a privileged and relatively protected position until the 
late 1970s. There was a belief that bad doctors were few and far between, the 
quality of care was difficult to define and impossible to measure, and the 
doctor’s performance was not the business of colleagues or managers. There 
was a culture in which information was not transparent or accessible. The 
scandals of 1980s and 1990s disintegrated the concept of pure self-regulation. 
However, the Chief Medical Officer, the writer of the report, emphasized that 
the concept of medical regulation should not be limited to the identification of 
poor practice. The regulatory system should be able to demonstrate that all 
practicing doctors reach specified standards, and with doing that, should be 
conceived as a true guardian of professionalism.  
 
The international trend in medical regulation 
The Health Foundation is an influential and “independent charitable foundation 
working to improve the quality of healthcare across the UK”. As a positive 
response to the report “Good Doctors, Safer Patients” from Department of 
Health, The Health Foundation published the report “Professional regulation for 
high standards” in November 2006 (http://www.health.org.uk). Besides UK, the 
worldwide trend in medical regulation is moving from pure self-regulation to 
regulation in partnership between the profession and public (table 3).  
 
Linking assessment to competency  
“Good Doctors, Safer Patients” also highlighted that while there are moves 
towards ongoing assessment of competence, there is no model in which such 
assessments are explicitly and universally linked with the practitioner’s ability 
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to practice, and subsequently medical regulators should be placed within the 
wider quality assurance framework. There is no systematic way in which 
doctors can assess the quality of their practice and identifying the 
opportunities to improve it, perhaps because currently used methods (in that 
time in the UK) like annual appraisal, CPD, and clinical audit do not adequately 
face the related but different tasks of assuring good practice, identifying poor 
practice, and acting as an instrument for quality improvement. A substantial 
shift in attitude will be needed to consider medical regulation as enhancing the 
quality of a physician’s practice and the wider medical profession rather than 
predominantly seeking out and punishing those who perform poorly.  
Public and profession partnership in the rest of Europe 
Last year Swedish Medical Association published a booklet entitled “Quality 
Assured Continuous Education for All Physicians” (Kvalitetssäkrad Fortbildning 
för Alla Läkare) (http://www.slf.se/upload/3128/fortbildning_webb.pdf). The book is in 
Swedish and the writer of this thesis has performed the translations.  
The following statements stand at the “Summary” section of the booklet: 
“Knowledge is one of the healthcare’s cornerstones, where the quality of care 
is often settled by the treating physician’s competence and skillfulness. For 
that reason there should be prerequisites in place for the physicians to obtain 
new knowledge during the whole working life and to improve patients’ 
diagnostic and treatment together with the colleagues”. In the same booklet 
there is an outline of different existing revalidation systems in European 
countries. This outline divides European countries in three different categories 
depending on their system of voluntary or compulsory participation in CME/CPD 
and requirement for re-certification.                                                                             
1- The first category consists of those countries with voluntary CME/CPD, 
i.e. Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece (private 
physicians), Luxembourg, Iceland, Spain, Malta, Portugal, Norway 
(specialists), and Sweden.                          
2- The second category is consisting of those countries with compulsory 
participation of physicians in CME/CPD activities, i.e. Cyprus, France, 
Italy, Norway (general practitioners), Poland, Greece (public 
employees), Slovenia, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany (hospital 
physicians), Austria, and Hungary.                               
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3- The third category consists of those countries with requirement of re-
certifying, i.e. Netherlands, United Kingdom, Ireland, Croatia, Rumania, 
and Slovakia.                    
This outline gives a rather good overview of the revalidation processes in 
Europe but it is at the same time quite simplified. Other simplifications are the 
definitions of “Quality Improvement”, “Quality Assurance”, and “Quality 
Control”. In the booklet it is stated that these terms “are used internationally 
to describe the process of improvement regarding the physician’s continuous 
education”. These terms, in fact, stand for other concepts. It is of course quite 
legitimate to redefine them and use them in different contexts (like CME and 
CPD), but an historical introduction of the original concepts is perhaps 
necessary to avoid confusion. The matter of fact is that these terms have 
originally been used extensively in connection with the quality of care as a 
whole and not in the context of physician’s continuous education. As mentioned 
earlier, Avis Donabedian was the first person who used these terms 
systematically in a whole healthcare quality context.  
The booklet’s definitions of these terms are:  
Quality Improvement: “all the continuous education that the physician 
participates in on the basis of his/her own need to maintain and improve 
his/her competence”.  
 
Quality Assurance: “quality guarantee of the physician’s continuous 
education. In Sweden examples of this are systematic documentation, peer 
inspections, and CME-questionnaires. The aim is to create a reliable follow-up 
system capable of detecting deviation from continuous learning, to avoid 
errors, create confidence, and the control of the authorities becomes 
unnecessary”.          
                                      
Quality Control: “authority-steered follow-up of the physician’s continuous 
education”. 
 
The incorrect definitions of these terms are a minor problem with this booklet. 
The major problem is that here, Swedish Medical Association, the body of 
medical profession in Sweden, illustrates its unwillingness to share the 
responsibility of continuous education with the authorities. The authorities in 
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democratic societies, like Sweden, should reasonably be regarded as 
representatives of the public, and public comprises among others of patients, 
patient organizations and taxpayers. The question remains if an old-fashioned 
concept of professional autonomy “without undue outside influence” should be 
regarded as an appropriate model of professional autonomy in our modern era.   
 
But the question is what the term quality improvement really stands for? The 
answer is to be fount in the third annual report of “The Health Foundation”. 
The report is entitled “An evaluation of the health Foundation’s engaging with 
quality initiative”    
(http://www.health.org.uk/publications/evaluation_reports/ewi_3rd_evaluation.html): 
“Quality improvement involves stepping back from the immediate 
challenge of delivering care to reflect on the benefits of alternative 
ways of delivering care and, where appropriate, changing how care is 
delivered. It will often include an element of ‘learning by doing’ but 
should always involve an assessment of the resources required and the 
improvements in quality achieved. It is therefore not just another word 
for ‘doing a better job’ or ‘working harder’. It is not always (or even 
often) ‘whole system reform’ but it does involve improving the design of 
at least one part of the system through which healthcare is delivered. 
Illustrating the kinds of things this might involve, the scope of the 
Cochrane Review Group ‘Effective Practice and Organization of Care’ 
includes case management; revision of professional roles; use of 
multidisciplinary teams; and formularies and changes in medical record 
systems and financial interventions. We are aware that not all change is 
improvement. QI requires a specification of the level at which 
improvement is anticipated (micro, meso, and macro) and the clinical 
setting where it is expected to work. It requires some statement of the 
relationship between the proposed actions and a set of measurable 
changes that are of benefit to patients and/or public health. And it 
requires some reduction in the indicators of poor quality such as: 
I. failure to apply scientific evidence 
II. provision of inappropriate care 
III. unjustified variations in practice (eg by practice, time of 
consultation, age, gender, and geography etc) 
IV. avoidable patient harm. 
To be sustainable, it also involves connecting these intended 
improvements in quality to the preferences and satisfaction of service 
users, user organizations, and political representatives to maximise the 
benefits of health interventions. These preferences might reasonably 
include not only efficacy and effectiveness but also fairness”. 
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The Donabedian terms of quality control, quality assurance and quality 
improvement in intensive care setting may be described as follow (81):                                                                                        
“Quality control involves inspecting for problems in the ICU service. For 
example, a statistical sample would be inspected (e.g. the last 25 patients 
discharged from the ICU) to determine readmissions (also called ‘feed-back 
control’). Such audits may be undertaken on an occasional or regular basis.    
                                                  
Quality assurance encompasses control beyond just inspection. It is a 
structured approach to preventing quality problems through planned and 
systematic activities that include: specification, review, monitoring and 
documentation (‘feed-forward control’). An example of Quality assurance is 
the regular assessment of ICU lab equipment to show suitable accuracy of the 
results.                 
                        
Continuous quality improvement promotes continuous improvement through 
the application of group decision-making methods and statistical tools. A goal 
of an ICU’s quality improvement programme is to meet and exceed patient and 
patient family satisfaction by examining and improving systems and work 
processes.” 
 
Interpretations of regulation and revalidation 
Back to the UK, according to the “Good Doctors, Safer Patients” regulation is 
any measure or intervention carried out by (or on behalf of) government, or 
some other statutory body, that seeks to change the behavior of individuals or 
groups. 
Revalidation is defined as the evaluation of a medical practitioner’s fitness to 
practice. Revalidation that aims to demonstrate that the competence of 
doctors is acceptable is attracting increasing interest in Europe, drawing the 
experiences from USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. While 
accountability, minimal acceptable standards of care, and quality improvement 
are generally motivations for revalidation, the definitions, mechanisms, and 
practicing of revalidation varies significantly across member states. CME, aimed 
to keep the physicians up-to-date, is the most basic form of revalidation. The 
next step is CPD that includes CME along with the development of personal, 
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social, and managerial skills. More demanding methods involves peer review, 
external evaluation, and practice inspection (82). Austria, Germany, and Spain 
regard CME as a means to promote recertification and quality of care, while 
Belgium, France and the Netherlands also incorporate peer review. In the UK 
revalidation includes both re-licensure and re-certification through appraisal 
and feedback. There are also differences between countries regarding 
monitoring and enforcement. The regulators of revalidation in many countries 
are professional medical bodies that may be accountable to government 
ministries. Insurers may be regulators of revalidation and require physicians 
contracted with them to fulfill specific requirements. In most cases a 
combination of stakeholders are responsible for minimal standards and 
revalidation (82).  
Revalidation is generally expected to be transparent and not serving to punish, 
with efforts focused on professional development. Belgium encourages 
revalidation, instead for mandating it, by rewarding participating physicians 
with higher wages. In France there is a legal obligation to participate in CME, 
but many physicians do not so, most likely because of lack of incentives 
(neither reward nor punishment) for compliance combined with lack of 
monitoring. In the UK re-licensure and re-certification (for GPs and specialists) 
occurs every five years and physicians who fail in either processes would spent 
a period of time in supervised practice. Depending on the specialty evidence to 
support recertification come from various sources including clinical audit, 
knowledge tests, patient feedback, employer appraisal, CPD, or observation of 
practice. Besides the UK, only Germany and Netherlands have formal 
revalidation systems in place. Since 2005 Dutch physicians undertake CME and 
undergo a visit by peers every five years. The visits involve a comprehensive 
assessment of the practice and adherence to clinical guidelines. The table 
below summarizes the characteristics of revalidation in some selected European 
countries (82):   
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Table 3: Revalidation of the medical profession in selected European countries 
Data sourced from country questionnaire. 
Types of revalidation 
Country 
Time 
frame 
(years) 
CME/ 
CPD 
 
Peer 
review 
 
Compulsatory Penalty / reward 
Lead 
regulator Other authorities 
Austria 3 Yes Yes Yes 
Legal 
requirement 
Austrian 
Medical 
Chamber (PB) 
Federal Ministry of 
Health and Woman 
(G): Austrian 
Academy of 
Pysicians 
Belgium 3 Yes Yes No 
Financial 
incentive 
(increased salary 
by about 4%) 
Minister of 
Public Health 
(G) and 
INAMI/RIZIV 
(IF) 
N/A 
France 5 Yes Yes  (EPP) Yes 
Law suit by 
Regional 
Council of the 
Physicians´Order 
(not monitored)  
National 
Councils for 
CME (PB) 
Regional Councils 
for CME (PB); 
Regional Councils 
of the Physicians´ 
order (PB); High 
Health Authority 
(IA) 
Germany 5 Yes Yes 
Yes  (GPs and 
specialists 
contracted by 
SHIF) 
Non-compliance 
results in 
reduced 
reimbursement; 
then after two 
years withdraw 
of accreditation 
Regional 
Chambers of 
Physicians 
(PB) 
State Ministry of 
Health or Social 
Affairs (G); 
Regional 
Associations of 
SHIF Physicians 
(PB); Federal 
Association of 
SHIF-Physicians 
(PB) 
The 
Netherlands 5 Yes 
Yes  
(visitation) Yes  (specialists) 
Removed from 
medical registrar 
Central 
College of 
Specialists 
(PB) 
Central Information 
Centre for 
Professional 
Practitioners in 
Healthcare (G) 
Spain N/A 
Yes (9 
of 17 
regions) 
N/A No 
Varies between 
regional 
commissions 
Spanish 
Medical 
Association 
(PB) 
Ministry of Health 
and Education(G); 
Medical Colleges 
(PB); Commission 
of Continuing 
Education of Health 
Professionals; 
Accreditation 
Council for CME 
(PB) 
United 
Kingdom 5 Yes 
Yes  (360 
degree 
feedback 
exercise) 
Pending: GPs and 
specialists 
Failure will 
result in practice 
supervision 
Department of 
Health (G) 
General Medical 
Council (PB); Royal 
Colleges (GPs, 
specialists) (PB) 
 
CMF= Continuing Medical Education; CPD= Continuing Professional Development; EPP= 
Evaluation of Professional Practices; G= Government; IA; Indipendent Authority; IF= Insurance 
Fund; N/A= not applicable; NHS= National Health Service; PB= Professional body; SHIF= Social 
Health Insurance Fund (With permission from Royal College of Physicians, London) 
14. Clinical governance and clinical accountability 
Clinical governance is the term used by the United Kingdom’s National Health 
Service (NHS). UK’s Department of Health defines clinical governance as: “the 
system through which NHS organizations are accountable for continuously 
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improving the quality of their services and safeguarding high standards of 
care, by creating an environment in which clinical excellence will flourish” 
(http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publichealth/Patientsafety/Clinicalgovernance/DH_114). 
Clinical accountability, which is used in other healthcare jurisdictions, is similar 
to clinical governance (81). Clinical governance ensures that there are clean 
lines of accountability and that there is a comprehensive program of quality 
improvement systems. The six pillars of clinical governance include education 
and training, research and development, clinical effectiveness, openness, risk 
management and clinical audit 
(http://www.medicine.ox.ac.uk/bandolier/painres/download/whatis/WhatisClinGov.pdf).  
In the following there is a short explanation of these concepts: 
1- Clinical Audit  
Audit has been discussed previously in connection with accreditation. In the 
following section audit will be discussed as a major component in clinical 
governance. Clinical audit is reviewing of clinical performance, measurement of 
the performance against agreed standards, and finally refining of the clinical 
practice. Clinical audit was formally introduced into the NHS in 1993. In 1997 it 
was incorporated within clinical governance through the White Paper, “The 
New NHS, Modern, Dependable”, which combined different service 
improvement processes and established a coherent Clinical Governance 
framework. 
In the paper “Principles for best practice in clinical audit”, the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) defines clinical audit as: “a 
quality improvement process that seeks to improve patient care and outcomes 
through systematic review of care against explicit criteria and the 
implementation of change. Aspects of the structure, processes, and outcomes 
of care are selected and systematically evaluated against explicit criteria. 
Where indicated, changes are implemented at an individual, team, or service 
level and further monitoring is used to confirm improvement 
in healthcare delivery”. 
UK’s Department of Health describes further that: “Clinical audit and outcomes 
measurements are quality improvement tools that can help to close the gap 
between what is known to be the best care and the care that patients are 
receiving. They aim to ensure that all patients receive the most effective, up 
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to date and appropriate treatments, delivered by clinicians with the right 
skills and experience. Clinical audit against good practice criteria or standards 
answers the question – are patients given the best care? Clinical outcomes 
measurement answers the questions – are they better, and do they feel 
better?” (http://www.rpd-research.org.uk/about.html). 
 
2- Risk management 
In the healthcare setting there are risks to the patient, risks to the physicians 
and other practitioner, and risks to the provider organization. These risks all 
need to be minimized as part of any quality assurance program. 
 
3- Openness 
Poor performance likes closed doors. Processes which are open to open public 
examination are an essential part of quality assurance.  
 
4- Research and development 
Good professional practice has always sought to change in the light of evidence 
from research. 
 
5- Clinical effectiveness 
Clinical effectiveness is a measure of the extent to which a particular 
intervention works. The measure on its own is useful, but it is enhanced by 
considering whether the intervention is appropriate and whether it represents 
value for money.  
6- Education and training             
In the modern health service, it is no longer acceptable for any clinician to 
avoid from continuing education after qualification. Education and training is a 
pillar in clinical governance and one may use different educational techniques 
for modifying the behavior of physicians as we will discuss in the next section. 
As a fact of matter, education is key component in both quality (clinical 
governance and accountability) and patient safety. Swedish doctors have 
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considered “competency” as one of four problem areas in patient safety, and 
competency itself is a result of education and training.   
15. Educational techniques for modifying the 
physicians’ behavior towards a higher level of 
patient safety 
 
There is publishing a great amount of medical literature each day. Many studies 
have shown that physicians are not able to keep themselves up-to-date all the 
time and memorize all the material they read. Education programs (CMEs), 
practice guidelines, critical pathways, and clinical decision support 
systems are the techniques offering potential solutions to this problem and aim 
to modify the physicians’ behavior. The methods used to implement these 
techniques are of key importance in their effectiveness. The most prevalent 
method traditionally has been use of lectures, conferences, mailings and 
printed materials, but other methods like audit and feedback, academic 
detailing, local opinion leaders, and reminder systems have also been used. 
There has also been an opinion about incorporating sentinel incident reporting 
and root cause analysis into the educational programs. A long tradition of 
evaluation of effectiveness of these methods is non-existing (21).   
CME/CPD 
These educational programs have been described elsewhere in this thesis. 
Practice Guidelines 
Practice guidelines are defined as “systematically developed statements to 
assist practitioner and patient decisions about appropriate health care for 
specific clinical conditions”. They are among the most widely used methods of 
modifying physician behavior and may affect both the process and the outcome 
of care (21).  
Critical Pathways 
Critical pathways belongs to those models that streamline work and production 
processes. Critical pathways have been utilized extensively in several different 
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business sectors including the construction and automotives industries. It is 
theorized that the adaptation of pathways to health care, particularly inpatient 
care, may help ensure the delivery of quality care and decrease the occurrence 
of medical errors (21). 
Clinical Decision Support Systems 
Clinical decision support systems (CDSS) assist the clinician in applying new 
information to patient care through the analysis of patient-specific clinical 
variables. Many of these systems are used to enhance diagnostic efforts and 
include computer-based programs that provide extensive differential diagnoses 
based on clinical information entered by the clinician (21).  
Audit and feedback 
Audit, which is a central and fundamental part of NHS’ clinical governance, 
may be applied to both institutional and individual level.  
With respect to assessment of individual practitioner, and apart from clinical 
governance, audit, and other educational techniques, in the UK it was recently 
decided that physicians should be revalidated regularly. The reason was to 
ensure that the physicians' knowledge and skills are up-to-date. Revalidation of 
physicians is thought to function as a system for providing accountability, 
maintaining a definite level of the standards of care, and promoting 
improvements in healthcare quality. General Medical Council in UK 
(http://www.gmc-uk.org) underscores that “Good doctors make the care of 
their patients their first concern: they are competent, keep their knowledge 
and skills up to date, establish and maintain good relationships with patients 
and colleagues, are honest and trustworthy, and act with integrity”.  
 
Academic detailing 
Academic detailing or educational outreach involves a personal visit, by a 
trained person, to healthcare professionals in their own settings. This has also 
been referred to as university-based educational detailing and public interest 
detailing. Originally described as a multi-component process where key 
principles included surveys of practitioners to determine barriers to appropriate 
practice and the subsequent development of an intervention that was tailored 
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to address those barriers using simple messages; targeting of practitioners with 
low compliance; and the delivery of the intervention by a respected person. 
The intervention often included feedback on existing practice (83). 
Local opinion leaders 
Social Learning Theory hypothesizes that individuals perceived as credible, 
likeable and trustworthy, are likely to be persuasive agents of behavioral 
change. Such “opinion leaders” may play a key role in assisting individuals to 
identify the evidence underpinning best practice and to facilitate behavior 
change. Opinion leaders are those perceived by their colleagues as 
“educationally influential” (84). 
Sentinel incident reporting 
Incident reporting identifies those areas where patient safety and clinical 
practice can be improved and allows an open and unemotional discussion on 
errors. The following factors are important for a functioning incident 
monitoring system: anonymous self reporting, simplified documentation, 
obligatory participation, inclusion of events without patient damage (near 
miss), regular and quick evaluation, reporting of deviations to all caregivers, 
and linkage to management decisions (16). Errors should not only be reported 
but also be discussed openly and with a focus on solutions (17).  
Root Cause Analysis 
This is a retrospective approach to error analysis and is widely applied to 
investigate major industrial accidents. Root Cause Analysis has its foundations 
in industrial psychology and human factors engineering. It provides a structured 
and process-focused framework to approach sentinel event analysis.  
Computerized physician order entry (CPOE) 
CPOE is a technological system, which assists the clinician to create a legal and 
standardized order. CPOE can improve patient safety only with the addition of 
another technological system called clinical decision support system (CDSS). 
CDSS in their most fundamental form include basic dosing information and 
incompatibility guides. More sophisticated CDSS include allergy and interaction 
checking, duplicate therapy checking, dosing for special populations and organ 
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function (like pediatrics or geriatrics, renal impairment, liver disease), 
laboratory monitoring, disease screening (i.e., β-blockers in asthmatics), and 
pregnancy warnings. Therefore, CPOE is an approach with a focus on education 
to assure a correct ordination of medications, rather than depending on a 
potentially tired and troubled intensive care physician. With respect to 
technology, ICU is a technology rich environment where there is a perception 
that additional technologies may enhance safety. CDSS, CPOE, bar-coded 
medication administration, “smart” infusion pumps and electronic health 
records are technologies attributed with improving safety. These technologies 
have been linked to reduction in errors, even though there is little evidence 
that they reduce harm to the patients. There is also evidence that these 
technologies can introduce new types of errors, violations, and harm. 
Generally, the way the technologies are implemented and supported, the 
interactions between technologies and people determines whether technologies 
like CPOE will improve or sometimes worsens medication safety (85;86). 
A short summary of effectiveness of these techniques 
There are several Cochrane reviews in this field. A recent review illustrated 
that printed educational materials, when compared to no interventions, have a 
beneficial effect on process outcomes but not on patient outcomes (87). 
Another review showed that audit and feedback may help improve performance 
with a variable effectiveness from small to moderate (78), while local opinion 
leaders was evaluated to be able to successfully promote evidence-based 
practice (84). Educational outreach visits have been shown to have small but 
consistent and important effects on prescribing. Their effects on other types of 
professional performance vary from small to moderate (83). There has also 
been shown that multifaceted approaches are more effective than approaches 
based on single interventions (21).  
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16. Financial incentives and costs in quality and 
patient safety 
Cost and Quality 
The concept of the omnipotence clinician who “knows best” was dominant 
since the time of Hippocrates until the Second World War. The challenge came 
from two directions; first, the notion that poor clinical outcomes might reflect 
faulty investigations, diagnosis or treatment (the quality), and second, the fact 
that some investigations and treatments are more expensive and often are used 
inappropriately (the cost). Regarding the quality aspect of the problem some 
argued that the major problem was trusting in human minds consistently.  
The response to these cost and quality problems in United Kingdom was clinical 
audit as a peer review activity; either in local level or national level. The 
principles of audit is that the clinicians critically review results of their own 
work on a regular basis and compare those results with those of others, and if 
there are lessons to be learned change their practice. In the United States it 
was used either professional review with mandatory second opinion or 
professional reviewers to check that the elements of care were within 
predefined limits. This wave of clinical audit was failed. The problem probably 
was that there was a conflict between clinical audit as a tool for education and 
professional development and its use for monitoring performance. The principle 
of audit was good but the practice of it was bad (2). 
 
The question of cost and quality is still considered to be of great importance in 
healthcare. There have been attempts to promote the quality of care as well as 
to cost control and reduction by introducing different incentives in different 
healthcare financial systems. It has been suggested that payment should be 
attached to providers’ behaviour and that all types of health plans should have 
strong incentives to improve performance and encourage delivery system 
change. Performance measurement as well as quality measurement and 
reporting systems are prerequisites for improving performance. However, 
focusing on cost and quality separately may be the wrong way of solving either 
problem (88-94).  
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Impact of financial incentives on quality improvements 
We know that the use of financial incentives to influence behavior is common in 
all areas of commerce. There are a good amount of research on and literature 
about the design and impact of incentives at different levels, i.e. the principal-
agent relationship in theoretical economics (examining financial incentives in 
contracts under different assumptions), employee compensation (compensation 
with different payment approaches to encourage desired behavior), or 
consumer responses to targeted incentive programs in marketing literature. 
Interest in the impact of financial incentives on provider behavior has 
traditionally been focused on the need to improve efficacy (in publicly funded 
systems) and a desire to moderate the growth in healthcare costs (in market-
based systems). Recently, there has been increased interest in specific 
relationships between financial incentives aimed at providers and quality of 
care. However, the amount of research devoted to the impact of financial 
incentives on the quality of care is limited. The quality of care, as mentioned 
earlier, is defined by Institute of Medicine as ”the degree to which health 
services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired 
health outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge”.  
 
In 2007 a comprehensive review of the literature examining the effect of 
financial incentives on the quality of care delivered by health care 
organizations and practitioners was published (Financial incentives, healthcare 
providers and quality improvements: A review of evidence) (95). The reviewers 
used an extensive infrastructure of search strategy and involved several 
credited organizations like Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and World 
Health Organization (WHO). The review illustrated that the literature on the 
influence of financial incentives in provider’s quality of care was not fully 
developed. However, there could apparently be noticed an ongoing change at a 
relatively rapid pace.  
At the same time the science of measuring quality in the healthcare is 
increasing and financial responsible bodies are intensifying their efforts to 
measure and reward quality improvement. This will probably generate a 
significant amount of new research that has at least two tasks; first to 
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document the relationships between financial incentives and adherence to best 
practices or changes in patient outcomes, and second contribute to a better 
understanding of the linkages between financial quality rewards and 
practitioner behavior.  
The findings of “Financial incentives, healthcare providers and quality 
improvements: A review of evidence” can be summarized in the two sections: 
1. Financial incentives directed at improving quality and 2. Secondary impacts 
on quality of financial incentives directed at reducing utilization and costs. 
These two sections are reprinted in appendix 6. 
Impact of quality improvements on cost reductions 
Poor quality and adverse events are common and costly. In the UK, one in ten 
hospital patients suffer an adverse event (infection, adverse drug event, 
surgical complication, and fall) that necessitates extra treatment. Poor quality 
may be defined as suboptimal care in form of overuse, misuse, and underuse of 
tests, treatments, and services or ineffective use of them. Failure in 
communication, transfers, and coordination are other aspects of poor quality. 
Improvements and interventions, which do cost but make care better, may be 
defined as changes that result in a better health service for patients.  
To increase quality and productivity and decrease waste, health personnel may 
be organized in project teams and use different methods to change their work 
and organization. There is strong evidence that changing providers’ behavior to 
use patient safety practices or validated effective treatments at clinical level 
will improve patient outcome. There is also evidence that some of these 
behavior changes save money or increase income for some providers (96). The 
two important areas connected to improvement are effectiveness and savings. 
In respect with effectiveness there is evidence for effectiveness of some 
interventions (like computer physician order entry or prophylaxis before 
surgery), but there is less evidence for effectiveness or costs of other suggested 
interventions.  
Regarding costs, quality improvement can be costly especially where there is 
little infrastructure or experience to support improvement. There are also 
great variations in implementation of interventions. We know that provider’s 
quality improvement often does not lead to saving because the financial 
systems does not measure or reward higher quality. On the other hand and 
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strangely enough, providers may have financial disincentives to make 
improvements; firstly they bear the intervention costs, secondly they cannot 
get the investment finance, and thirdly they are financially rewarded for poor 
quality.     
Briefly, improving quality sometimes saves money and sometimes does not. 
Savings depend on the type of improvement, the cost of it, and who pays the 
cost of poor quality. Due to limitation of research and lack of evidence we do 
not know if improving quality saves money or not in majority of cases. But we 
should not forget that available research, as mentioned above, illustrates that 
improving quality sometimes saves money, and describes when, where and why 
it does so. The following equation illustrates the role of different elements in 
improving the quality of care (96) : 
 
(Evidence of an effective change) + (Effective implementation method) + 
(Supportive environment and infrastructure) = Improved quality 
 
Research may provide information about all these elements to the providers. 
But a key factor in determining whether providers make savings is the amount 
of the costs they bear i.e. the costs of poor quality and the costs of 
intervention solutions. Sometimes providers are paid extra by purchasers to 
treat the adverse events. Recently, some purchasers in the US shifted the costs 
of some adverse events to the providers by introducing “never events” which 
involves exclusion of providers from reimbursement as financial penalty for not 
achieving certain standards.  
Financially it should be made more advantageous for providers to increase 
quality. In order to do this routine financing systems should be changed and 
performance measurements should include quality measures. The new financing 
systems should 
I. ensure that providers bear more of the costs of poor quality, especially 
where their costs shift to other stakeholders (like in case of delayed 
transfer and lack of prevention) 
II. measure quality and quality costs in routine service settings  
III. finance local improvement expertise 
IV. spread the investment costs for interventions over time and between 
providers, purchasers and others  
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Saving money is not a strong motivation for clinicians to improve quality. 
Ethical, moral, and professional motives are also important for clinicians, but 
these alone have not proved sufficient for improving quality.  
In summary, there are enough evidence to show which changes we should focus 
on and how we should implement them. The cost of inaction and not using this 
knowledge is probably high, both financially and in terms of human suffering 
(96).  
17. Changing the practice towards a more patient 
safe healthcare 
Denial of the suboptimal patient safety   
Healthcare is among the most complex systems in the world. Errors in 
healthcare are not random and are usually predictable. Some errors have their 
roots in organizations and culture and traditions in healthcare micro-systems. 
Preventable errors are a major source of mortality and morbidity in hospitals. It 
seems that consequent and safe application of available medical knowledge 
would involve far more quality improvement in healthcare than the continuous 
search for newer and better therapies. Unfortunately, many physicians do not 
consider medical errors as a key problem in healthcare (16). ICUs are not 
exceptions. Adverse events are common in ICUs (commonest complications are 
ventilator procedures or therapeutic errors) and ICU physicians may 
underestimate these by as much as a factor of 10 (19). Denial of the problem or 
denial of the problem’s gigantic dimensions may be regarded as the most 
important hindrance for change towards a more patient safe healthcare.   
System errors and operator errors 
Errors leading to an adverse event and patient harm may represent a system 
failure (system errors), a practitioner failure (operator errors), or a failure of 
both (97) .It have been suggested that in complex systems, system errors are 
the principal responsible factor in dominating majority of adverse events but 
with the involvement of operator errors in many of them. Operator error may 
be skill-based, rule based, or knowledge. Knowledge base errors are primarily 
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due to problems with information, thinking, and remembering. Violation, 
however, is deliberately doing something wrong, sometime based on a “right 
argument”. Violations used to be due to problems of motivation or problems 
within the work environment.  
Clinicians generally do not appreciate the notion that system errors play a part 
in adverse events. If they are involved in an adverse event they feel personally 
guilty and are often prepared to accept more than their fair share of the blame 
(operator error) (97).  
Safety in safety-critical and high reliability organizations 
Safety-critical organizations, domains, or industries are those that operate in a 
dynamic and hazardous environment. High reliability organizations are those 
safety-critical organizations that have substantially succeeded in avoiding 
errors and catastrophes. All safety-critical organizations rely on humans to 
perform the tasks, and humans commit errors in a relatively limited number of 
ways. Thus there are similarities between the kinds of errors that have 
occurred or occur in these organizations. Inadvertent errors because of for 
example distraction (slips), errors of the memory (lapses), and errors caused by 
lack of knowledge (mistakes) are frequent kind of human errors.  
Commercial aviation is a high reliability industry. In the 1970s and 1980s it 
suffered a series of major accidents that cost approximately 10 billion dollars 
and caused the loss of some 7000 lives. Investigations showed that human 
factor (pilot error) was the cause of crashes. The airline industry began to 
understand that it knew very little about the nature of human error. The 
industry performed a systematic approach to the problem that may be called 
engineering safety approach. 
The characteristics of the engineering safety approach are: 
• Mandatory creation and use of standard operating procedures (like 
protocols and check lists)  
• Implementation of safety repetition and duplication measures (like 
double-checks and time-outs) 
• Acknowledgment that the system complexity goes far beyond the ability 
of any single individual and encouraging teamwork and second opinion  
• Continuous updates and the use of best current available information 
(imperfect research is not an excuse for not to change) 
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• Errors are described by using system models and subsequently corrective 
efforts are more focused on “how” instead for “who” 
• Near misses represent an opportunity to improve the system especially if 
freely discussed.  
• Enhancing situational awareness and the notion that optimal crisis 
management begins before the crisis occurs (“flying ahead of the plane” 
by pilots) 
Subsequently, commercial aviation achieved a radical reduction in its fatalities 
and now there is only 1 fatal crash per 4.5 million take offs. These magnificent 
results are not comparable with the statistics of healthcare with respect to 
patient harms.  
These measures used by commercial aviation for reducing accidents included: 
I. Standard operation procedures (followed very closely and consistently) 
II. Applying a less steep hierarchy in the organization (which forced for 
instance pilots to be open to input from the co-pilot) 
III. Use of simulators to develop teamwork 
IV. Auditing 
Doctors like pilots do commit the above mentioned errors. The difference is 
that the pilots are equipped with tools to help them recognize potential and 
evolving errors. These tools, which are generally lacking in healthcare, either 
prevent the errors from happening or mitigate their effect once they have 
occurred.  
Another high reliability organization is nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in US 
navy. The flight deck operations occurring on these carriers are extremely 
dangerous. The rate of serious accidents in these units, which are now virtually 
accident-free, has been reduced by 97% compared to some 50 years ago. The 
tools to achieve these outstanding results include:  
I. Use of standard operating procedures,  
II. Investigating accidents and near accidents 
III. Perform training to avoid accidents and near accidents in future  
IV. Institution of a culture of confidence and trust 
V. Regular staff training in technical skills and in the role of human factors 
in errors 
VI. Excess in hardware personnel and procedures 
VII. Use of simple safety systems,  
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VIII. Open management and a balanced hierarchy where appropriate  
IX. Personnel and process auditing 
 
The common feature of high reliability organizations may be summarized as 
follow: preoccupation with failure, compliance and adaptability, operation 
audits (analysis of operations), institution of a safety culture with a total 
determination to achieve consistently safe operations. In this culture 
individuals feel comfortable to draw the attention to potential hazards or 
actual failures without fear of sanctions from management.  
Humans have limited memory capacity and limited ability to perform several 
tasks simultaneously. Additionally stress and fatigue increase the rate of errors 
and cognitive biases (like anchoring bias and tunnel vision bias). These are 
some of the reasons why it is impossible to prevent operator error completely.  
Hence, the establishment of protection strategies is necessary. A protection 
strategy may include among others the systems for defending, detecting, and 
reversing as well as designing the future preventive methods (23;97).  
 
Swiss-cheese model 
Protection against error may be resembled as layers of defense shields.  
These defense layers or barriers against the occurrence of errors include among 
others trained personnel, good communication routines, reliable technology, 
appropriate administration and leadership, adequate checking routines, 
existence of procedures and a safety culture in unit. The barriers together 
construct a nearly impermeable shield against errors. Despite the defense 
shield errors still occurs but hopefully through the correct function of the 
defense barriers they should be stopped in their way to produce harm. There 
may be weaknesses in the barrier layers making it possible for an error to pass 
through and cause harm. The weaknesses may be resembled as holes in a Swiss-
cheese slice (barrier layers). If an error succeeds to pass a barrier (through the 
hole in the barrier) and proceed, it will hopefully be stopped at the next 
barrier. However, if there are several barrier holes lined up in front of each 
other there exists an opportunity for an error to pass through all the defense 
layers and produce harm. Hence, it is essential to establish intact and 
functioning error barriers to avoid harm (98). 
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Communication failure 
The term “error chain” describes the sequence of events that lead to an 
accident. The rings in the error chain may be regarded to be the same as holes 
in the barrier layers in Swiss-cheese model. Breaking the error chain is quite 
essential in avoiding harm. High reliability organizations train their Personnel to 
break the error chain by targeting its weakest point. The weaker points of error 
chain are: 
1- Communication failures 
2- Poor checking behaviors 
3- Inadequate or inconsistent procedures 
4- Interruptions 
5- Changes of plan 
Communication failure is an important component in the error chain and may 
reflect the problems of both healthcare system and individual practitioner’s 
(the operator’s) behavior and attitude. There is a general lack of awareness 
about the extent of communication failures between clinicians and the very 
significant adverse effects that these communication failures exert on patient 
outcomes.  
Communication failures within and between teams in safety-critical 
organizations can be divided into the following categories: 
I. Absent message (a total failure to communicate) 
II. Content problems (missing or incomplete data) or inappropriate 
tone 
III. Addressing problems (speaking to the wrong person) 
IV. Wrong communication medium (telling something to a colleague 
rather than writing it down to the patient’s notes   
V. Inappropriate time (distracting a colleague with a less urgent 
communication) 
VI. System failures (inadequate communication channels, lack of 
communication skills and training)  
Communication failure was in fact one of the important shortcomings in the 
“Bristol case”. Bristol case was the tragic circumstances around the death of 30 
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children who underwent heart surgery at Bristol Royal Infirmary between 1991 
and 1995. The children died as a result of substandard care. The caregivers who 
were well intentioned and well trained stilled could produce harm because of 
working in a culture that lacks insight into its own shortcomings. The final 
report of “Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry” (http://www.bristol-inquiry.org.uk/) states 
that: “The story of the pediatric cardiac surgical service in Bristol is not an 
account of bad people. Nor it is an account of people who did not care, nor of 
people who willfully harmed patients. It is an account of people who cared 
greatly about human suffering, and were dedicated and well motivated. Sadly, 
some lacked insight and their behavior was flawed. Many failed to 
communicate with each other, and to work together effectively for the 
interests of their patients. There was a lack of leadership, and teamwork”. 
Further “an imbalance of power, with too much control in the hands of few 
individuals”. Hence human errors may occur, despite the caregivers’ good 
intentions, as a result of a defect care. The first victims of human errors are 
those patients (and their families) who suffer harm, and second victims are 
those doctors and nurses who are often set up to be the final and visible link in 
an error chain. For these practitioners the burden of knowing that they have 
harmed a patient may be substantial. The enormous economic costs of errors is 
also a burden which should be carried by the taxpayers who may be regarded as 
the third victims of errors in healthcare (97).   
Role of leadership in Systemic changes and building a safer 
ICU  
After the publication of the report “Crossing the quality chasm: a new health 
system for the 21th century”, published by Institute of Medicine in 2001, it has 
been widely accepted that the major cause of adverse events is system 
deficiencies and not the behaviour of individual professionals.   
Research has demonstrated undoubtedly that “good healthcare management” 
has a positive impact on clinical and safety performance in ICUs. One of the 
studies illustrating this was the paper “The performance of intensive care units: 
does good management make a difference?” written by Shortell and colleagues 
and published in 1994. The paper, which was based on data from 18000 
patients in 42 ICUs, illustrated that superior organizational practices were 
related to four characteristics: a patient-centered culture, strong medical and 
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nursing leadership, effective communication and co-ordination, open and 
collaborative approaches to problem-solving and conflict management. 
Research has also shown that ICU staffing by trained ICU physicians leads to 
better patient outcome (81).  
Intelligent systemic changes are necessary to make improvements in patient 
safety work. Improvements best can be achieved by systemic application of a 
broad array of changes in process and organization, and with supervision, 
training, simulation, and teamwork. The role of leadership is vital. Leadership 
should define the safety vision and align organizational quality and safety goals, 
identify current situation and its difficulties. Leadership should allocate 
resources and provide organisational support, staff focus, and education and 
training. Leadership should also support error reporting systems, disclosure and 
truth around medical errors and try to establish patient and family partnership 
for safety (9). Knowing that quality is a multidimensional construct, it is 
unlikely that a single approach would be effective. There is a need for a 
combination of different approaches and developing appropriate systems for 
patient care both in ICU and other wards in the hospitals (99). With respect to 
the relative roles of structure/system versus individual practitioner, and as it 
was mentioned earlier, leadership is a part of the structure and in fact the 
most important part of it but this does not imply that the performance of the 
individual practitioner should be ignored (31). The General Medical Council has 
described recertification (called revalidation in the United Kingdom and 
Canada) as “one element of the quality framework which aims to address two 
distinct but complementary purposes; ensuring patient safety and improving 
the quality of patient care” (100).  
The old understanding of patient safety and healthcare quality consisted of an 
essential operator-centred element. According to this understanding the 
operator   has the total responsibility when errors occurred. In this school the 
operator was the scapegoat and the relevance of structure and system were 
totally forgotten. This concept has been changed over the time and now the 
relative roles of operator and system in patient safety and quality have largely 
been balanced in many countries. However, recently a challenging theory has 
been emerged nearly claiming that systems bear the whole responsibility of 
suboptimal care (85).   
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Organizational culture and information processing 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO) patient safety includes three 
complementary actions: preventing adverse events, diminishing their effects 
when they occur, and making them visible. Making them visible perhaps should 
be the first step, as without the knowledge provided by data the problems 
cannot be identified and the impact of preventive measures cannot be 
evaluated (101). Leadership is the key element in all these three actions.  
Patient safety does not only refer to prevention of error. If this was the case 
then patient safety had gained a reactive rather than proactive and 
comprehensive characteristic. Patient safety means the assurance that every 
patient will receive medical care that is timely, appropriate, and evidence-
based. This means that patient safety include both absence of error and the 
reliable use and safe practice of processes in ICU. A combination of human 
factors and system factors (like workload) are causes of critical events. 
Development of a safety culture with open communication of problems at all 
levels, and aiming to overcome the culture of blame and shame and create a 
new attitude toward learning, are ICU leaders’ distinct responsibilities (102). In 
order to influence the behaviour of ICU staff it is necessary to build a culture of 
safety in which healthcare personnel perceive safety as a high priority goal. 
Organizational culture is the norms, values, beliefs, and assumptions that are 
shared by the members of an organization. Organization climate is shared 
perceptions on the part of employees regarding formal and informal policies, 
procedures, and practices concerning certain aspects of the work environment 
such as service, safety, and quality. The terms “culture” and “climate” are 
usually used interchangeably. Patient safety climate may be defined as shared 
perceptions of medical team members regarding the importance of patient 
safety in their unit. There are a number of tools and surveys to measure patient 
safety climate. The measuring surveys should be specific for each professional 
group (for example physicians and nurses) and examine only the phenomenon of 
patient safety and nothing else (103).   
The ICU culture is also consists of beliefs, values, faith, attitudes, norms, and 
assumptions. These may be expressed in form of how people work together, 
how they communicate, how they adopt to challenges, and how they react to 
errors. According to the article “A typology of organisational cultures” written 
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by R. Westrum amd published in “Quality and Safety in Health Care” December 
2004, there are three types of organizational cultures based on how the leaders 
of these organizations handle the information. The following table illustrates 
these three kinds of organizational cultures (104).  
Table 4: How organizations process information 
 
 Pathological  culture Bureaucratic culture Generative culture 
Organization Power oriented Rule oriented Performance oriented 
cooperation low  Modest High 
Messengers shot neglected trained 
Responsibilities shirked Narrow  Risks are shared 
Bridging discouraged tolerated encouraged 
Failure results in     scapegoating justice inquiry 
Novelty crushed leads to problems implemented 
 
With permission from: Westrum R. A typology of organisational cultures. Qual 
Saf Health Care 2004 Dec;13 Suppl 2:ii22-ii27 
 
The three organizational cultures may be described as “pathological or power-
oriented”, “bureaucratic or rule-oriented”, and “generative or performance-
oriented”. The way of cooperation and treating messengers, responsibility, 
bridging, failure, and novelty is different in these three organisational cultures.  
There are many other aspects of organization culture that are not illustrated by 
this table, like education and training, structure, and styles of problem solving. 
Furthermore, there are effective organizations that are not generative. The 
performance of these organizations is based on other features, like a brilliant 
algorithm or a charismatic leader. Ultimately, it is the goal of an organization, 
which may be or may not be patient safety, determines the level of patient 
safety in that organization . This means that performance oriented 
organizations are not necessarily the best in patient safety, but they tend to be 
more creative, open, and solution-oriented which in turn make their processes 
to be more patient safe.  
Components of a safety culture 
The components of a safety culture include openness and fairness, constant and 
active awareness of the potential for adverse events to happen, encouraging 
people to speak up about their mistakes, and willingness of staff to learn from 
the mistakes as well as their willingness to put things right.  
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Error reporting, use of check lists, teamwork, and right communication are 
thought to be those elements of ICU culture which may be of special 
importance in patient safety. However, it is not always easy to establish a solid 
link between these elements and improved patient outcome despite improved 
process outcome. Furthermore, a rigorous reporting work may show increased 
adverse events while “standardized mortality rate” decreases. The explanation 
of this phenomenon is not easy but perhaps the kind of events that is reported 
may play a role. We know that the majority of adverse events have little or no 
influence on clinical course of patients and some of the events may be 
detected early so that contra-active measures can be applied (104;105).  
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18. Résumé of the literature survey 
Patient safety is one of the biggest healthcare problems today (106). There are 
international data indicating that clinicians have poor compliance with 
evidence-based guidelines where consistent use of these guidelines increases 
quality and patient safety. The current situation is that only approximately 50% 
of patients receive recommended therapies (107). Translating evidence into 
clinical practice has been challenging. Now there has been developed an 
explicit model for a collaborative transition of knowledge into practice (108). A 
flowchart of this method has been illustrated in appendix 7.   
We know that the explanation of physicians’ behavior and their poor guideline 
compliance is not an easy task. This may be the reason why there have been 
developed approximately 13 different current explanation models. However, 
there are many other barriers than the behavior of the clinicians and their 
compliance to the guidelines. Generally, barriers or factors to guideline 
compliance may be divided into four categories namely clinician -, system -, 
guideline -, and implementation factors (107).  System factors (like non-
compliance) are the crucial variables in occurrence of errors and accidents. 
System may be defined as the sum of the structure, process, and culture in the 
unit. The important system factors include task factors (e.g. availability of 
protocols and test results), team factors (e.g. care -, crisis – and hand-over 
communication, seeking help, supervision, team structure and leadership), 
environment (e.g. physical environment, staffing levels, work load, skills mix, 
administrative and managerial support, availability and maintenance of 
equipment), and organizational factors (e.g. the culture of unit, 
communication, teamwork) (107;109). With this background it would be 
predictable that uni-factorial interventions like education alone might not be 
the solution of compliance with evidence-based guidelines and there is a need 
for multi-factorial interventions (107).   
These multi-factorial interventions should first of all eliminate the 
preventable harm resulting from failure to standardizing care and failure to use 
evidence-based guidelines. Accordingly, professionalism should be strengthened 
meaning that evidence should be translated into practice (108) and should be 
implemented. There certainly would be barriers to implementation of evidence 
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where necessitating the use of a systematic and practical tool to identify and 
eliminate them. Professor Pronovost has described one such a tool called 
“Barriers Identification and Mitigation (BIM) Tool” (110) (appendix 8). It should 
be stressed that a tool like BIM would operate most optimally in the context of 
a larger and more extensive patient safety program like “Comprehensive Unit-
Based Safety Program (CUSP)” (111). There exists also a web-based version of 
CUSP (112). The use of checklists is of paramount importance for securing the 
process of translation of evidence to practice as well as its implementation 
(113;114). In fact the use of checklist was one of the main pillars in the 
developing CUSP (111).  
Culture is of central importance for any comprehensive patient safety initiative 
to be successful. Changing the culture and instituting a new culture of patient 
safety, not only in the front line institutions like university hospitals but also 
across the whole healthcare system and at the patient and practitioner level, is 
a demanding process. A survey of current culture in the unit should be the first 
step in the course of changing the culture towards a culture of patient safety. 
For this reason there have been developed culture survey questionnaires with 
approved validity and reliability (115) 
(http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/patientsafetyculture/hospscanform.pdf).                               
The survey of current culture should preferably be incorporated in a more 
comprehensive patient safety program, like CUSP. In fact the first step in CUSP 
is performing a culture survey. In other words, CUSP safeguards the right 
approach to both culture and professionalism in a patient safety initiative.  
“The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) announced in 
October 2009 that a program called the Comprehensive Unit-based Safety 
Program (CUSP), which successfully reduced central line-associated blood 
stream infections in intensive care units, will expand to all 50 States and 
additional hospitals in States already participating in the CUSP, extend to 
other settings in addition to intensive care units, and broaden its focus to 
address other types of health care-associated infections”.  
(http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/haicusp.htm) (www.patientsafetygroup.org/program/index.cfm) 
A flowchart of CUSP has been demonstrated in appendix 9 to facilitate the 
understanding of the steps involved in the program.  
Expectedly, dysfunctional systems, sometimes created by non-competent 
providers or administrators, make it difficult to act correctly.  
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System thinking, however, combined with the notion that “most errors are 
committed by good, hardworking people trying to do the right thing” has built 
the platform for “no blame” culture. Now, this culture has begun to be 
questioned and the need for accountability for failure is gaining some grounds. 
The need for a “just culture” which differentiates blameworthy from blameless 
acts has been declared (116).  
Promoting quality and patient safety in general may necessitate the 
implementation of a global, versatile, and comprehensive system, much alike 
that of clinical governance from NHS. Moreover, the measures for promoting 
patient safety may be divided in two categories; measures at the unit level and 
measures at national level. At the unit level (micro-level) there is a need for 
strengthening professionalism as described earlier in this section. In brief, we 
need to implement more specific programs for translation and implementation 
of evidence, for identification and mitigation of evidence implementation 
barriers (like BIM), and for comprehensive patient safety initiatives (like CUSP 
initially developed for ICUs). Regarding the national level, first it should be 
stressed that we in the western countries suffer from insufficient training in 
quality and patient safety depending to our collective failure to comprehend 
the delivery of health care as a science (117;118).  Hence, long term measures 
in national level should include investigation in the science of quality and 
patient safety, revising the quality and safety governance in our hospitals, and 
integrating the roles within the hospitals and medical faculties (117). Short 
term measures in national level may first include system approaches (like for 
instance accreditation of hospitals, departments, and units), and then a 
practitioner approach (like obligatory revalidation). The profession, authorities, 
and the public should cooperate regarding the type, extend, and 
comprehensiveness of revalidation (CME/ CPD, Peer review, or both), as well as 
its financing, organizational forms, and involved penalties or rewards.  
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19. The history and present status of quality and 
patient safety in Norway 
In this section the work performed within the healthcare quality and patient 
safety in Norway will shortly be introduced. Norwegian Medical Association 
(NMA) at the end of 2006 published a document entitled “The Norwegian 
Medical Association’s Policy of Patient Safety” (called “PPS-document” further 
on in this thesis) (http://www.legeforeningen.no/asset/34520/1/34520_1.doc). PPS-
document included a comprehensive list of quality and patient safety initiatives 
taken by both NMA and Norwegian healthcare authorities up to 2007. PPS-
document, which has kept its importance until now, is a quite comprehensive 
document and has been used as one the main information sources in this 
section. Briefly, NMA established early three quality assurance funds that have 
played an essential role in promoting quality and patient safety during the last 
two decades. Quality assurance fund (QAF) I was established in 1991 with an 
orientation towards primary health care and private specialist practice. QAF II 
was established in 1992 and aimed to support the projects in the specialist 
healthcare. QAF III was established in 1997 and financed the quality 
development of laboratory services in primary care that is the NOKLUS project 
(Norwegian quality improvement of laboratory services outside the hospital). 
NMA, through its competency and funds, has performed a number of important 
patient safety projects. QAFs have provided support to hundreds of projects 
and the NMA's annual "Quality Days", a two-day seminars gathering healthcare 
professionals, managers, administrators, and representatives for information 
exchange. In 1997, NMA established cooperation with leading international 
patient safety organizations, like Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) in 
Boston, and since then has actively participated in promoting patient safety. In 
1998, NMA began to implement Norwegian "Breakthrough Projects" in large 
parts of the healthcare system in cooperation and co-financing with healthcare 
authorities. Breakthrough method was innovated in 1995 by IHI and since then 
has continuously been improved giving rise to “Breakthrough Series” 
(http://www.ihi.org/NR/rdonlyres/3F1925B7-6C47-48ED-AA83-
C85DBABB664D/0/TheBreakthroughSeriespaper.pdf). The aim of Norwegian 
breakthrough projects was to increase the quality of care by targeting systems 
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as well as systematic implementation of quality improvement measures.  
Norwegian ICM and some Norwegian ICUs became early involved in patient 
safety projects. In fact, ICM was one of the included areas in the breakthrough 
projects. An example of a breakthrough project in ICU is the project of 
systematic assessment and adjustment of the depth of sedation in mechanically 
ventilated patients. This project led to a shorter length of mechanical 
ventilation in ICU patients (119;120). Driving horse of these and other quality 
and patient safety activities was NMA's quality improvement committee during 
the years 1992 - 2005. During this period a great deal of work was performed. 
PPS-document, however, underlines that "there is a lack of systems for 
nationwide dissemination and implementation of the achieved experiences 
and knowledge".  
In general, patient safety has long been a focus of attention among the senior 
members of anesthesiology and intensive care medicine in Norway. This is 
reflected in different publications such as a publication from 1991 discussing 
quality assurance of medical equipments (121) and two publications from 
1990,s discussing human errors and errors in ICUs (122;123). Focus on quality 
and patient safety is also reflected in the establishment of quality registers and 
patient safety databases.  A database for registration of adverse events in 
anesthesia was established in St. Olav’s Hospital in Trondheim in 1985. A 
similar database for systematic registration of adverse events in ICU was 
constituted in 1993 in Haukeland University Hospital in Bergen. Furthermore, 
Norwegian Intensive Register (NIR) was also established in Haukeland University 
Hospital in Bergen in 1999. The national quality registers, with few exceptions, 
started by enthusiastic clinicians often under the auspices of the specialty 
associations in the NMA and many of them received financial support from the 
QAF II. Financing, management and responsibility for some of the registers have 
gradually been moved to regional health administrators. Today, there are 13 
central "health registers" like cancer register, cause-of-death register, and birth 
register. There are no quality data in these registers. Additionally, there are 
approximately fifty medical quality registers that include quality data but they 
are administered by different operators. In Health Conference in 2008, it was 
stressed that we should go for national systems with many high quality 
registers, like Denmark and Sweden.    
Norwegian health authorities have also played a crucial role in improving 
91 
 
healthcare quality and patient safety in Norway. Legislations and regulations 
belong the main tools of improvement for authorities. Legislations like the need 
for “Justifiability” in practice (aiming to protect the patients from 
"unnecessary" risk for damage), requirement of implementation of internal 
control systems, and requirement of reporting of adverse effects have been 
important steps in promoting quality and safety. The Norwegian Board of 
Health Supervision performs the audit of patient-related activities as another 
important measure of promoting quality and patient safety.   
The Ministry of Health and Care Services in 2003 ordered a report on patient 
safety. In that report Professor Peter Hjort introduced a comprehensive 
overview of the problem areas and suggested a number of specific measures, 
like the establishment of a reporting system to an independent national center 
without disciplinary authority. Norwegian Directorate of Health has also 
focused on patient safety through, among others, its comprehensive 
publications (circulars, national guidelines, guides, reports, recommendations, 
statutory regulations, evaluations, hearings and so on) and through following up 
the work of national quality indicators in healthcare. Norwegian Directorate of 
Health in 2005 published "National Strategy for Quality Improvement in the 
Social- and Health Services" for the coming ten years was (124). In this 
extensive document the necessity of working with multiple approaches as well 
as different measures at different levels to ensure the quality of services was 
specified. These levels include community and system levels, organizational 
and institutional levels, and the levels of the individual practitioners and users. 
In the section “The strategy's approach to improvement” the measures 
Norwegian authorities currently use to improve the quality of services was 
described. These measures include regulations, education and authorization of 
personnel, financing, audit, prioritization of resources, as well as research, 
summary of current knowledge, and technology assessment for improvement of 
the scientific basis of the medical practice. “Services with good academic 
standards” and “delivery in a good and humane way” are two pervasive 
elements in this strategy document. Further, there have been described those 
principles that should be the basis for all improvement efforts. These principles 
include the existence of measures that can document continuous change as 
well as the necessity of anchoring the improvement efforts to the management 
and leadership and including the practitioners and users. According to this 
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strategy improving quality goes through strengthening the users, strengthening 
the practitioners, improving the management and organization, strengthening 
the knowledge of improvement during the primary educations, and monitoring 
and evaluating the services. Moreover, there have been described detailed 
measures to be taken to achieve each of these objectives; “further 
development of systems for patient safety” being one of the measures.  
Norwegian health authorities have also been aware of the importance of quality 
registers and quality indicators and according PPS-document they have 
supported actively establishing of the quality registers for years. However, PPS-
document in 2006 declared that the quality indicators in that time had a 
character of being more like quantity indicators. The authorities have 
continued the substantial work with quality indicators which has resulted in two 
valuable publications (125;126) . 
In summary it is clear that both the Norwegian health authorities and NMA have 
a sound and solid understanding of quality and patient safety, all in accordance 
with the literature survey presented in this thesis. They have absorbed the 
international knowledge of patient safety and in turn contributed to production 
of such knowledge; like the importance of teamwork and use of checklists (127-
131) or more ICU-specific knowledge in quality and patient safety (132-134). 
Further, they have initiated and carried out a great many quality and patient 
safety activities. The achievements have not been few, which may naturally 
raise a great sense of satisfaction. The question is if we should be satisfied with 
this satisfaction?  
We know that in our country we still miss a great many of our patients because 
of adverse events. A calculated number for this is up to 2000 lives each year 
(http://test.tidsskriftet.no/index.php?seks_id=1790214) which is an alarming number. It 
was only for three years ago the PPS-document was published and the situation 
today should not be very different from then. In the following I record in italic 
some short sections of PPS-document (all translations have been performed by 
Albert Castellheim). These statements may constitute a platform for future 
work in quality and patient safety in our country.  
 “In Norwegian healthcare system the work of patient safety is still in its 
starting phase”. 
 
“Norwegian Board of Health Supervision commends and appreciates the good 
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thinking around specific adverse events in different medical communities, but 
criticizes the healthcare administrators and physician-leaders for the lack of 
prioritization of patient safety. We know that the "system thinking" and 
"process" is not included in medical education implying the notion that such 
knowledge is relatively poorly developed within the profession. Physicians 
have had limited tradition of interdisciplinarity in thinking and in practical 
work”. 
 
“Patient safety work in Norway must be developed”. 
 
“Patient safety should be on the agenda and be relevant for physician leaders 
and representatives, at scientific meetings and in The Journal of Norwegian 
Medical Association”. 
 
”Hospital owners and managers have shown a limited degree of interest in 
working with safety at patient level. Moreover, educational institutions have 
not taken any specific measures (to educate healthcare personnel) at collage 
level or university level. Stavanger University Hospital is an exception”.  
 
At the end of the PPS-document there are five suggestions regarding the 
methods to promote patient safety: “Promoting patient safety includes five 
main areas: cooperation, culture, professionalism, regulatory, and 
technology. There is potential for improvement in all areas. Work with the 
patient safety is complex where all the stakeholders are interdependent and 
all the elements affect each other”. These suggestions are also totally in 
accordance with the results of the literature review presented in the previous 
section in this thesis. Some short reflections on these suggestions: 
In connection with cooperation it is necessary to stress that a common 
language, understanding, and cooperation between the stakeholders of 
healthcare are essential and should initially be secured. For instance, a field 
that needs a higher level of common language and cooperation is the field of 
health and quality registers. There is a need for common understanding 
regarding the necessity of these registers and their content, and cooperation 
regarding how to initiate, organize, and manage them. In the document 
“National Strategy for Quality Improvement in the Social- and Health services” 
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published by Norwegian Directorate of Health in 2005, the following goal was 
stated clearly: “ Support and further develop professional quality registers; 
locally, regionally and nationally”. In 2008 the Ministry of Health and Care 
Services initiated the national health registry project to coordinate and 
modernize the existing national medical quality registers and the central health 
registers. The project led to the development of the important document 
“Good health registers - Better health; Strategy for the modernization and 
coordination of the central health records and medical quality registers 2010-
2020” with action plans for 2010-2011 (www.nhrp.no). Unfortunately, there seems 
to be disagreement about the basic concepts of the registers that may make 
obstacles for cooperation in this regard 
(http://www.tidsskriftet.no/index.php?seks_id=1958579) 
(http://www.tidsskriftet.no/?seks_id=1976006).  
Further, without reaching an acceptable and necessary level of cooperation it 
would be impossible to work with culture, the second suggestion. The central 
importance of culture in patient safety was extensively discussed in the last 
section, Résumé of the literature survey. In fact, the existence of a culture of 
patient safety will automatically imply the need of an acceptable level of 
professionalism aiming to increase patient safety through secure deliver of 
evidence-based medicine.   
The next suggestion is regulation that is used as a steering system for 
improving quality and patient safety by Norwegian health authorities, like other 
health authorities. An important matter concerning specific regulations is their 
form, content, appropriateness, and timeliness. Regulations normally should be 
based on an accepted cultural platform to be able to be successfully 
implemented. Certification of hospitals and wards, and revaluation of 
physicians may be the main areas where regulations may lead to improvements. 
According to IHI, still half of all care given to the patients is unscientific 
(http://www.ihi.org/IHI/Results/WhitePapers/TheBreakthroughSeriesIHIsCollaborativeModelfor
Achieving+BreakthroughImprovement.htm). In this regard one of the goals should be 
institution of an effective educational system that would strengthen 
professionalism and reduce the rate of given unscientific care. We know that 
our current system of CME/CPD has difficulties to meet this goal 
(http://www.legeforeningen.no/asset/49386/1/49386_1.pdf). On this background one 
may think of regulation on revalidation as one the appropriate measures to 
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ensure that physicians are up-to-date and compliant to the guidelines. Anyhow, 
there seems to be a need for discussion between the healthcare stakeholders 
regarding revalidation and the future form of CME/CPD, its financing and 
administrating. Do we need regulations to secure the delivery of scientific care 
and do regulations alone secure the delivery of scientific care? Regardless the 
form of CME/CPD, with or without regulation, my personal impression is that 
any measure that would reduce the number of unnecessary deaths due to 
unscientific care would broadly be accepted in our country.   
In summary, in Norway there have been done much in the field of quality and 
patient safety but much more remains to be done.  
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20. The survey on patient safety and CME 
We know that errors happen frequently in the ICUs (123;135-137) and at the 
same time ICU physicians have the best intentions to care for their patients. We 
were interested in the ICU physicians´ perceived roles of ICU system factors in 
patient safety (like CME/CPD, evidence-based protocols, and leadership) as 
well as the roles of attitudes and culture of the units. We know that leadership 
is a system factor and has the highest level of responsibility in every 
organization, including healthcare organizations. This responsibility is total and 
includes every aspect of organizational structure, process, and outcome. 
Further, this responsibility is time unlimited meaning that it is valid all round 
the clock every day. Hence, ICU leaders and their attitudes are major 
determinants of patient safety issues (perception of the concept of patient 
safety and taking measures for increased patient safety). The main aim of the 
study was to determine whether the ICU physicians and ICU leaders are of the 
opinion that there is necessary to increase the patient safety level in these 
units. Exploration of their opinion about all other major factors in patient 
safety (like CME/CPD) was regarded as secondary aims of the study.  
Subjects and methods 
A questionnaire constituted by 23 questions was send as an e-mail link to two 
study groups (appendix 10). The first study group was the “leader group” and 
the second study group was the Norwegian members of The European Society of 
Intensive Care Medicine (ESICM).  
The leader group was itself comprised of three categories: first the leaders of 
the ICUs in all five university hospitals (seven ICUs) in Norway. An ICU leader 
was defined as either an administrative physician-leader or as an academic 
leader (professors and assistant professors). In Norway there are five university 
hospitals. ICUs in Norway are usually staffed and run by anesthesiologists and 
serve as organizational units belonging to the departments of anesthesiology. 
The second category of leaders who received the questionnaire was the leaders 
of these mother departments of anesthesiology. The third category of leaders 
who received the questionnaire was a limited number of peers who in the past 
have functioned as either administrative or academic leaders and currently are 
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regarded to exert some significant degree of influence on ICUs. In Norwegian 
university hospitals there are limited numbers of ICUs, which do not belong to 
the departments of anesthesiology. The leaders of these ICUs did not receive 
the questionnaire as well as those leaders who are not physicians. Totally 29 
leaders received the questionnaire. The response time was between 11 May and 
14th June. During this time the non-responders received two reminders. The 
total number of responders was 14 (48%).  
The second study group, the Norwegian members of ESICM, was thought to be 
the representatives of the physician staff in ICUs. However, the membership in 
ESICM is open for all clinicians including physicians, nurses, physiotherapists, 
nutritionists, and clinical pharmacists. However, there are reasons to believe 
that the absolute majority of the Norwegian ESICM members are physicians. 
The questionnaire was sent to this group (67 clinicians). Three clinicians were 
excluded on their own demand (one guest physician who had moved back to her 
native country, one non-physician practitioner who meant she was not the right 
person to answer the questions, and an ICU leader who had received and 
responded to the questionnaire previously).  Hence, the total number of 
receivers was 64. The response time was between 2nd June and 18th June 
2010. The number of responders was 24 (37.5%). Compared to the first group, 
this group had two additional questions to answer in the questionnaire. The 
first question was about if the responder works in a university hospital (62.5% 
answered that they work in a university hospital). The second question was 
about if the responder had a leader function without defining what the leader 
function was (33% answered that they had a leader function).  
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Results 
Numeric presentation of parts of data 
A complete and detailed numeric presentation of date is included in appendix 
10. Here we present some tables illustrating parts of these data. 
 
Question (Q)1-Do you think that the patient safety level is acceptable in your 
department? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86% of leader responders (LR) and 83% of ESICM member responders (ER) 
believe that the patient safety level is acceptable in their departments to a 
great extent or very large extent. 
 
Q2- To what extent do you think there are medical errors in your department? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100% of LR and 96% of ER believe that medical errors occur either to a small or 
some extent in their departments.  
 
Q3- What kind of mistakes do you think that doctors in your department make 
most frequently? Put only one tick. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
To a small extent 0.0 8.3 
To some extent 14.3 8.3 
To a great extent 50.0 70.8 
To a very large extent 35.7 12.5 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
 Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
To a small extent 57.1 41.7 
To some extent 42.9 54.2 
To a great extent 0.0 4.2 
To a very large extent 0.0 0.0 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
Q3- Kind of errors   Leaders ESICM 
Commission 0.0 4.2 
Both 57.1 20.8 
Omission 35.7 54.2 
Do not know / not applicable 7.1 20.8 
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Q20- If you are going to improve patient safety in your department, which 
department-based measure do you choose to take (if none of these are 
implemented)? Choose two options.       
Q20- Department-based measure  Leaders ESICM 
Reporting 71.4 8.3 
Root cause analysis 64.3 70.8 
Clinical procedures 28.6 50.0 
IT-based solutions 7.1 8.3 
Audit and feedback 7.1 25.0 
Structure changes 28.6 25.0 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 4.2 
 
Q21- If you are going to improve patient safety in your department through 
increasing competency of physician staff, what kind of CME do you choose as 
the most appropriate? Choose only one option.  
  Leaders ESICM 
Self-steering model 25 0.0 
Profession- steering model 50 90.5 
Regulation 25 9.5 
 
Q22- Altogether, do you think it is necessary to improve patient safety in your 
department? 
 Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
To a small extent 14.3 13.0 
To some extent 57.1 60.9 
To a great extent 21.4 26.1 
To a very large extent 7.1 0.0 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
 
 
Table following table illustrates parts of data in connection with the answer 
option “to a very large extend” in different questions:  
to a very large extent 
Leaders 
% 
ESICM 
% 
Q1-patient safety level is acceptable 35.7 12.5 
Q4- leadership performance is important 35.7 34.8 
Q6- explicit clinical procedures are important 50.0 37.5 
Q7- colleagues' attitudes are important 28.6 43.5 
Q8- motivation is important 28.6 29.2 
Q9- theoretical knowledge is important 21.4 37.5 
Q10- practical skills are important 21.4 41.7 
Q11- ethical awareness is important 21.4 20.8 
Q12- reporting of adverse events promotes good patient safety 50.0 58.3 
Q13- root cause analysis is important 35.7 47.8 
Q14- IT-based solutions are important 21.4 20.8 
Q15- external audit and feedback are important 7.1 20.8 
Q16- clinical experience alone is sufficient  0 0 
Q17- self-steering model of CME (like “LEIF”) is important 7.1 0 
Q18- profession-steering of CME (like GPs in Norway) is important 7.1 12.5 
Q19- regulation model of CME is important 21.4 4.2 
Q22- it is necessary to improve patient safety in your department 7.1 0 
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The graphic presentation of the results 
In the following the complete data have been demonstrated graphically. The 
reason is offering the readers an easy overview of all the data.  
 
 
Q1- Do you think that the 
patient safety level is 
acceptable in your 
department? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q2- To what extent do you 
think that there's medical 
errors in your department? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q3- What kind of mistakes do 
you think that doctors in 
your department make most 
frequently? Put only one 
tick. 
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To what extent do you think 
 
Q4- Leadership performance in your department is important for patient safety? 
Q5- Material resources and the treatment capacity in your department is 
important for patient safety? 
Q6- Explicit clinical procedures in your department are important for patient 
safety?  
Q7- Colleagues' attitudes to the introduction of new procedures or treatments 
are important for patient safety?  
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To what extent do you think doctor’s 
 
Q8- Motivation is important for patient safety in your department? 
Q9- Theoretical knowledge is important for patient safety in your department? 
Q10- Practical skills are important for patient safety in your department? 
Q11- To what extent do you think doctor’s ethical awareness is important for 
patient safety in your department? 
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To what extent do you think  
 
Q12- Physicians' reporting of adverse events (without risk of sanctions) is 
important to promote good patient safety in the intensive care units in general? 
Q13- Root cause analysis based on the reporting of adverse events is important 
for patient safety in the intensive care units in general? 
 
Q14- IT-based solutions (for example in the drug administration / reminders / 
support for clinical decisions) are important for patient safety in the intensive 
care units in general? 
Q15- External audit and feedback are important for patient safety in the 
intensive care units in general? 
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To what extent do you think 
 
Q16- Clinical experience alone is sufficient to achieve high degree of patient 
safety? 
 
Q17- Self-steering model (for example “LEIF” program from The Norwegian 
Medical Association) is important to achieve high degree of patient safety? 
Q18- Profession-steering model of CME (for example, GPs in Norway) is 
important to achieve high degree of patient safety? 
Q19- Regulation model of CME is important to achieve high degree of patient 
safety? 
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Q20- If you are going to 
improve patient safety in 
your department, which 
department-based measure 
do you choose to take (if 
none of these are 
implemented)? Choose two 
options. 
 
 
   
Q21- If you are going to 
improve patient safety in 
your department through 
increasing competency of 
physician staff, what kind of 
CME do you choose as the 
most appropriate? Choose 
only one option. 
 
 
Q22- Altogether, do you 
think it is necessary to 
improve patient safety in 
your department? 
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Discussion 
In this section we will discuss shortly a limited number of the results and their 
implications. A more extended discussion of the results are planned to be 
performed in the future when we publish this study in an international journal.  
First of all it should be noted that the groups were alike and there was no 
statistical significant difference between the two groups in any question. This 
may reflect a common and collectively homogenous perceived understanding in 
the two groups regarding patient safety and education issues. The drawback of 
the survey, like other surveys of this kind, is the uncertainty of the answers and 
if they really reflect the real answer to the questions. Questionnaires like this 
are usually answered during work stress without time for deeper reflections. 
The responder usually chooses that answer which looks like more reasonable 
according to the first impression. The more adequate and reliable tool for 
studies like this study (investigating perceptions and attitudes), is probably 
deep interviews with limited number of well-chosen subjects.  
The first questions in the questionnaire, concerning the perceived levels of 
patient safety and proportions of errors consider awareness of patient safety 
issues in general. The first question deals with the perceived current level of 
patient safety (do you think that the patient safety level is acceptable in your 
department). 86% of leader responders (LR) and 73% of ESICM-member 
responders (79.5% in average) think that the level of patient safety is, either to 
a great extent or to a very large extent, acceptable. This is an overwhelming 
high level of conviction. Accordingly, the second question (to what extent do 
you think there are medical errors in your department?) was answered by 49% 
of the LR and ER in average as the medical errors occur only to a small extent.  
This initial part of the questionnaire and its first questions is complemented by 
the last part of the questionnaire where in question 22 the responders are 
asked if altogether, they think it is necessary to improve patient safety in their 
department. 84% percent of the LR and ER in average answered they think so 
either to a great extend or to a very great extend.  
The first part of the questionnaire may demonstrate that we are overconfident 
in that we do the right things and we do them right as well as our lack of 
knowledge regarding patient safety literature and movement. If we assume that 
the difference between the Norwegian healthcare outcomes and those 
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outcomes in USA or England is not significant then it will be legitimate to adopt 
the results of the reports like “To err is human” and “An organisation with a 
memory” to Norwegian conditions. This adoption would demonstrate a striking 
number of deaths as a result of preventable errors and perhaps make us less 
overconfident. 
In addition, there is a discrepancy between the answers to the question 1 and 
22 which may be explained by the fact that many physicians think that the 
level of patient safety is good/very good but at the same time they are 
interested in to further improve it. Another explanation may be that the 
responders really think they are good/very good initially, but during the time 
they spend answering the questions they changed their minds and become 
interested in improving patient safety. This may occur as the responders are 
confronted with the different aspects of patient safety as well as more or less 
crucial factors influencing it. With this explanation the 10-15 minutes of 
answering the questionnaire may be regarded as a well rewarding educational 
time in patient safety.  And if so, perhaps the most striking finding in our study 
was that there is a lack of patient safety awareness and education in Norwegian 
ICUs. Anyhow, one may simply emphasize only on the answer to the question 22 
and formulate the statement that nearly 85% of the LR and ER think it is 
necessary to improve patient safety in their ICUs. This is a clear signal to the 
profession, authorities, and leaders in the hospitals. I have previously (in the 
section “Résumé of the literature survey”) outlined my personal views, 
regarding how to increase patient safety in Norway. I think these views deserve 
repetition:  
The situation in Norway cannot significantly be different from other western 
countries and the appropriate measures to promote patient safety should be 
similar as those described here.  
A versatile and comprehensive system, much alike that of clinical governance 
from NHS, should be applied in Norwegian healthcare system by cooperation 
between the profession and authorities.  
At the unit level (micro-level), we need to implement more specific programs 
like BIM and CUSP for ICUs.  
And at the national level, Norway like US and other western countries should 
learn that the delivery of health care is a science. We suffer from insufficient 
training in quality and safety depending to our collective failure to 
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comprehend the delivery of health care as a science (117;118).  Hence, at a 
national level we need to implement the following long-term measures; 
investing in quality and safety science, revising quality and safety governance 
in our hospitals (first university hospitals), and integrating the roles within the 
hospitals and medical faculties (117). In short term, we need to have a system 
approach first (like accreditation of hospitals, departments, and units) and a 
practitioner approach afterwards (compulsatory revalidation). The profession, 
authorities, and the public should cooperate regarding types of this 
revalidation (CME/ CPD, Peer review, or both), its regulators and involved 
penalty or rewards.  
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21. Appendices 
Appendix 1: SIMPATIE vocabulary 
1- DETECTION OF RISK 
 Patient Safety: The continuous identification, analysis and 
management of patient-related risks and incidents in order to 
make patient care safer and minimizing harm to patients. Safety 
emerges from interaction of the components of the system. 
Improving safety depends on learning how safety emerges from 
such interactions. 
 Adverse Event: An unintended and undesired occurrence in the 
healthcare process because of the performance or lack of it of a 
healthcare provider and/or the healthcare system. 
 Please note: In this vocabulary adverse events are considered as 
preventable (Please see Diagram 1) although realizing, that the 
clinical distinction between preventable and non preventable 
events is rather academic. 
 Actual Event: An adverse event, which causes harm 
 Near Miss (sub-event): An adverse event, with the capacity to 
cause harm but which does not have adverse consequences, 
because of for instance timely and appropriate identification and 
correction of potential consequences for the patient. 
 Complication: An unintended and undesired outcome which 
develops as a consequence of intervention of an already present 
illness. It may be non preventable under the given circumstances. 
 Please note the related definition of term “Adverse Outcome”. 
 Sentinel Event: Sentinel reflects the seriousness of the injury 
and the likelihood that investigation of an event will reveal 
serious problems in current policies or procedures. Such 
occurrences signal the need for immediate investigation and 
response. 
 Critical Incident: Occurrences, which are significant or pivotal, 
in either a desirable or an undesirable way. Significant or pivotal 
means that there was significant potential for harm (or actual 
harm), but also that the event has the potential to reveal 
important hazards in the organization. In other words, these 
incidents, whether near misses or events in which significant 
harm occurred, provide valuable opportunities to learn about 
individual and organizational factors that can be remedied to 
prevent similar incidents in the future. 
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 Complaint: Each expression of resentment or discontent with 
the practice, operation or conduct of a healthcare provider made 
by a potential user or a user of the healthcare services or 
someone acting on their behalf. 
 Reporting System: A system which is designed to contain 
reports on adverse events. On the basis of reports analysis and 
communication of known causes and risk situations is possible. 
The system can contain reports on human and technical errors as 
well as organizational circumstances, which affects the 
occurrence of adverse events in the healthcare process. Reporting 
systems include input from all stakeholders – providers and 
service users. 
 Professional Standard: The standard of performance in 
particular circumstances taking into account recent insights and 
evidence-based norms and a standard of practice to be expected 
of a comparable experienced and qualified prudent practitioner 
in equal circumstances 
 Please note the related definition of term “Negligence”. 
 
2- ANALYSIS OF RISK 
 Harm: Negative consequence experienced by a patient leading to; 
death, a permanent or temporary impairment of physical, mental 
or social function or a more intense or prolonged treatment 
 Adverse Outcome: An unintended and undesired occurrence in 
the healthcare process, which causes harm to the patient 
 Please note related definition of term “Complication”. 
 Risk: The probability or chance that something undesirable will 
happen. A measure of the probability and severity of potential 
harm 
 Calculated Risk: A deliberately and consciously taken risk in 
which the benefits of a treatment are deemed to 
offset/countervail the possible burden of serious harm 
 Barrier: Protect people and structures from adverse events 
 Situational Awareness: Refers to the degree to which one’s 
perception of a situation matches reality 
  
3- RESULTING ACTIONS 
 Risk Management: Identifying, assessing, analyzing, 
understanding, and acting on risk issues in order to reach an 
optimal balance of risk, benefits and costs 
 Error Management: An approach to manage the aftermath of an 
error with the goal of reducing future errors, avoiding negative 
consequences and dealing quickly with consequences once they 
occur 
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 Action Plan: An Action Plan can be the result of analysis of 
adverse events. The Action Plan addresses system and process 
deficiencies; improvement strategies are developed and 
implemented 
 Culture of Safety: An integrated pattern of individual and 
organizational behavior, based upon shared beliefs and values 
that continuously seeks to minimize patient harm, which may 
result from the processes of care delivery 
 Human Factor: Refers to the study of human abilities, behaviors 
and characteristics as they affect the design and suggested 
intended operation of equipment, systems, and jobs. The field 
concerns itself with considerations of the strengths and 
weaknesses of human behavior, physical and mental abilities and 
how these affect the systems design. 
 
4- FAILURE MODE 
 Error: Preventable event leading to an adverse outcome being 
either an act of commission (doing something wrong) or omission 
(failing to do the right thing) that leads to an undesirable 
outcome or having significant potential for such an outcome 
 Situational Factor: The factor in a process, which activates an 
error in the system 
 Negligence: Care provided failed to meet the standard of care 
reasonably expected of a reasonably prudent and careful 
practitioner qualified to care for the patient in question 
 Please note the related definition of term “Professional 
standard”. 
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Appendix 2: ICPS definitions 
• Classification: an arrangement of concepts into classes and 
their subdivisions, linked so as to express the semantic 
relationships between them 
• Concept: a bearer or embodiment of meaning 
• Class: a group or set of like things 
• Semantic relationship: the way in which things (such as classes 
or concepts) are associated with each other on the basis of their 
meaning 
• Patient: a person 
who is a recipient of healthcare  
• Healthcare: services received by individuals or communities to 
promote, maintain, monitor or restore health 
• Health: a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing 
and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity 
• Safety: the reduction of risk of unnecessary harm to an 
acceptable minimum 
• Hazard: a circumstance, agent or action with the potential to 
cause harm 
• Circumstance: a situation or factor that may influence an event, 
agent or person(s) 
• Event: something that happens to or involves a patient 
• Agent: a substance, object or system which acts to produce 
change 
• Patient Safety: the reduction of risk of unnecessary harm 
associated with healthcare to an acceptable minimum 
• Healthcare-associated harm: harm arising from or associated 
with plans or actions taken during the provision of healthcare, 
rather than an underlying disease or injury 
• Patient safety incident: an event or circumstance which could 
have resulted, or did result, in unnecessary harm to a patient 
• Error: failure to carry out a planned action as intended or 
application of an incorrect plan 
• Violation: deliberate deviation from an operating procedure, 
standard or rule 
• Risk: the probability that an incident will occur 
• Reportable circumstance: a situation in which there was 
significant potential for harm, but no incident occurred 
• Near miss: an incident which did not reach the patient 
• No harm incident: an incident which reached a patient but no 
discernable harm resulted 
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• Harmful incident (adverse event): an incident that resulted in 
harm to a patient 
• Harm: impairment of structure or function of the body and/or 
any deleterious effect arising there from. Harm includes disease, 
injury, suffering, disability and death 
• Disease: a physiological or psychological dysfunction 
• Injury: damage to tissues caused by an agent or event 
• Suffering: the experience of anything subjectively unpleasant 
• Disability: any type of impairment of body structure or function, 
activity limitation and/or restriction of participation in society, 
associated with past or present harm 
• Contributing factor: a circumstance, action or influence which 
is thought to have played a part in the origin or development of 
an incident or to increase the risk of an incident 
• Incident type: a descriptive term for a category made up of 
incidents of a common nature, grouped because of shared, agreed 
features 
• Patient characteristics: selected attributes of a patient 
• Attributes: qualities, properties or features of someone or 
something 
• Incident characteristics: selected attributes of an incident 
• Adverse reaction: unexpected harm resulting from a justified 
action where the correct process was followed for the context in 
which the event occurred 
• Side effect: a known effect, other than that primarily intended, 
related to the pharmacological properties of a medication 
• Preventable: accepted by the community as avoidable in the 
particular set of circumstances 
• Detection: an action or circumstance that results in the 
discovery of an incident 
• Mitigating factor: an action or circumstance that prevents or 
moderates the progression of an incident towards harming a 
patient 
• Patient outcome: the impact upon a patient which is wholly or 
partially attributable to an incident 
• Degree of harm: the severity and duration of harm, and any 
treatment implications, that results from an incident 
• Organizational outcome: the impact upon an organization 
which is wholly or partially attributable to an incident 
• Ameliorating action: an action taken or circumstances altered 
to make better or compensate any harm after an incident 
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• Actions taken to reduce risk: actions taken to reduce, manage 
or control any future harm, or probability of harm, associated 
with an incident 
• Resilience: The degree to which a system continuously prevents, 
detects, mitigates or ameliorates hazards or incidents. 
• Accountable: being held responsible 
• Quality: the degree to which health services for individuals and 
populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes 
and are consistent with current professional knowledge 
• System failure: a fault, breakdown or dysfunction within an 
organization’s operational methods, processes or infrastructure 
• System improvement: the result or outcome of the culture, 
processes, and structures that are directed towards the 
prevention of system failure and the improvement of safety and 
quality 
• Root cause analysis: a systematic iterative process whereby 
the factors that contribute to an incident are identified by 
reconstructing the sequence of events and repeatedly asking why? 
Until the underlying root causes have been elucidated 
WHO explains that ICPS is not a classification but only a conceptual framework 
for an international classification representing a consensus of international 
experts on a reasonable understanding of patient safety. 
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Appendix 3: Luxembourg Consensus statement 
Continuing Professional Development 
Improving Healthcare Quality, Ensuring Patient safety 
Luxembourg ,14 December 2006 
 
 
Within our lifetimes major advances in Medicine have been, and 
continue to be made. The implementation of these is dependent on 
doctors learning how new techniques, therapies and clinical concepts 
can improve the quality and safety of care they provide for patients. 
Since its establishment the medical profession has recognised the 
importance of education, noting this as a core feature of its 
professionalism and a fundamental ethical principle. 
 
In this new century – characterised by an accelerating pace of change, 
increasing complexity, an unprecedented growth in information, and 
ever-increasing societal expectations – it is essential that doctors are 
supported in their continuing education, from medical school to 
retirement. Supported in this way, and entrusted with this 
responsibility, doctors will be more able to apply the beneficial effects 
of education, thus developing and improving their clinical performance. 
 
In addition to contributing to improvements in the care of individual 
patients, CPD also plays an important part in improving the quality of 
healthcare systems. This is through increasing doctors’ awareness of the 
need for, and how to achieve improved healthcare. By virtue of their 
clinical and managerial responsibilities, doctors are well-placed to 
implement beneficial changes to the quality, efficiency and 
effectiveness of healthcare. 
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While primarily directed at CPD for doctors, the principles of this 
statement are applicable in the context of the multi-disciplinary and 
multi-professional nature of modern healthcare and can also apply to 
other health professions. 
 
1) Continuing Professional Development (CPD) can be defined as the 
educational means by which doctors ensure that they maintain and 
improve their medical competence and clinical performance. As such 
CPD incorporates and goes beyond Continuing Medical Education (CME). 
 
2) It is an ethical and professional responsibility of every practising 
doctor to ensure that the medical care they provide for patients is safe 
and based on valid scientific evidence. In order to achieve this, every 
doctor must engage actively in CPD appropriate to their medical 
practice.  
 
3) Ultimately it is patients who benefit from the involvement of their 
doctor(s) in CPD — through the improved quality and safety of medical 
care. Patients also benefit from the greater availability of medical 
educational material, by being more able to learn about their own 
health, illness and treatment. This knowledge would be even further 
improved by enhancing the role of doctors in information for and 
communication with their patients. 
 
4) Irrespective of the nature of the healthcare system — whether 
employer-based, direct-paying, or insurance-remunerated — resources 
must be allocated to ensure that doctors are able to take part in CPD. 
Resources to support CPD include: educational activities; access to 
information technology; time for doctors to engage in education; peer 
support for a “learning culture”, and; financial resources and an 
educational structure to support these. 
 
5) Doctors are very familiar with learning, but learn in individual ways; 
recognition must be given to this. Doctors should be supported in being 
able to use the learning methods that they prefer, based on an 
assessment of their learning needs, and educational opportunities must 
be sufficiently varied to provide for this. However, doctors should also 
be encouraged to develop new ways of learning, and to learn how to 
make the most of new technologies that can assist with medical 
education. 
 
6) Every practising doctor must maintain those components of CPD that 
apply for all doctors, such as good communication, team-working, 
learning from audit and research. Similarly, each doctor must engage in 
“specialised” aspects of CPD, which are specific for each speciality, or 
sub-speciality, and are relevant to their individual area of medical 
practice. 
 
7) Specific attention must be given to the doctor’s work environment, to 
ensure that this is supportive of learning “on the job”. This will 
encourage doctors to reflect on, and learn from issues directly 
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applicable to their clinical practice. As important members of 
healthcare teams, doctors should also be encouraged to support multi-
disciplinary, and multi-professional team learning where that is relevant 
to the care of patients. 
 
8) Doctors also should take part in medical educational activities outside 
the workplace, such as learning through reading, e-learning activities, 
small group learning, and clinical conferences. These support the 
development of learning with reference to externally-set educational 
standards. 
 
9) It is important to ensure that learning also occurs when there may 
have been problems related to medical care. Accordingly, learning 
should be linked to clinical audit, patient and colleague feedback, and 
clinical/critical incident reporting systems, thus ensuring that these 
contribute to a culture of improving quality and safety. 
 
10) Doctors should reflect on what they have learned and on how this 
can be applied in their clinical practice. Every doctor, preferably in a 
peer dialogue, should regularly review the outcomes of their CPD, and 
consider what areas need to be addressed before the next review. To 
assist with this, doctors should keep a record of their CPD activities, 
ideally emphasising what they have learned. In addition to being 
supportive of good education, a system such as this – based on peer 
review of CPD goals set and achieved – also provides the basis for 
accountable self-regulation. 
 
11) In order to ensure that doctors can know that they are taking part in 
formal CPD activities that fulfil appropriately high quality standards, a 
quality assurance system, based on accreditation of CPD events and 
validation of providers, must be enforced. While usually these are 
national systems, in the case of the European Accreditation Council for 
CME (EACCME) accreditation can also be confirmed for international 
meetings. 
 
12) There must be appropriate regulation of formal CPD activities. All 
providers of formal CPD activities must adhere to policies – usually 
national - that ensure such CPD will be free of any form of bias. There 
must be a clear declaration by organisers and lecturers of any potential 
or actual conflict of interest, and transparency regarding the funding 
of educational activities. 
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Appendix 4: Luxembourg Declaration on Patient Safety 
Patient Safety – Making it Happen! 
Luxembourg , 5 April 2005 
 
 
 
Access to high quality healthcare is a key human right recognised and 
valued by the European Union, its Institutions and the citizens of 
Europe. Accordingly, patients have a right to expect that every effort is 
made to ensure their safety as users of all health services. 
 
Background: 
The health sector is a high-risk area because adverse events, arising 
from treatment rather than disease, can lead to death, serious damage, 
complications and patient suffering. Although many hospitals and 
healthcare settings have procedures in place to ensure patient safety, 
the healthcare sector still lags behind other industries and services that 
have introduced systematic safety processes. 
 
A number of investigations from all over the world have underlined the 
need for and the possibility of reducing the number of adverse events in 
the health sector. Current data show that almost half of all preventable 
adverse events are a consequence of medication errors. 
 
Accordingly, tools must be introduced aimed at reducing the number 
and consequences of adverse events. The health sector should be 
designed in a way that errors and adverse events are prevented, 
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detected or contained so that serious errors are avoided and compliance 
with safety procedures is enhanced. 
 
As a result of the work done in this field by many players and 
institutions and the evidence gathered, it is now clear that the first step 
that needs to be taken should be to establish a culture of patient safety 
throughout the entire health system. Risk management must be 
introduced as a routine instrument within the running of the entire 
health sector. A precondition for risk management is an open and 
trusting working environment with a culture that focuses on learning 
from near misses and adverse events as opposed to concentrating on 
“blame and shame” and subsequent punishment. 
 
Health sector induced harm to patients imposes a heavy burden on 
society. Investment in patient safety therefore has the potential to 
generate savings in expenditure coupled with an obvious benefit to 
patients. 
 
Focus on patient safety leads to savings in treating patients exposed 
to adverse events and the consequential improved use of financial 
resources. In addition, savings are achieved in administration costs 
associated with complaints and applications for compensation. Most 
importantly, patient safety contributes to an increase in quality of life. 
In order to achieve this, the culture of safety can be improved 
significantly in various ways. 
 
In light of the above, the conference recommends that “Patient Safety” 
has a significant place high on the political agenda of the EU, nationally 
in the EU Member States and locally in the healthcare sector. 
 
The conference recommends the EU Institutions: 
 To establish an EU forum with participation by relevant 
stakeholders to discuss European and national activities regarding 
patient safety. 
 To work in alliance with WHO Alliance towards a common 
understanding on patient safety issues, and to establish an “EU 
solution bank” with “best practice” examples and standards. 
 To create the possibility of support mechanisms for national 
initiatives regarding patient safety projects, acknowledging that 
patient safety is in the programme of DG Health and Consumer 
Protection 
 To ensure that EU regulations with regard to medical goods and 
related services are designed with patient safety in mind. 
 To encourage the development of international standards for the 
safety and performance of medical technology. 
 To ensure that the European regulatory framework protects the 
privacy and confidentiality of patient records in the best 
interests of the patient, while at the same time ensuring that 
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relevant patient information is readily available to healthcare 
professionals. 
 
The conference recommends to the National Authorities: 
 To provide patients with full and free access to their personal 
health information whilst ensuring data accuracy and that 
patients fully understand their treatment. It is acknowledged 
that “informed patients” are well positioned to safeguard their 
own health. 
 To consider the benefits of a national voluntary confidential 
reporting systems of adverse events and near misses. 
 To work towards the introduction of risk management routines, 
for example, by developing guidelines and indicators as a part of 
a quality assessment system in the healthcare sector. 
 To optimize the use of new technologies, for example, by 
introducing electronic patient records. Such records would 
include the personal medical profile and decision-making support 
programs for health professionals with a view to reducing 
medication errors and increasing compliance rates. 
 To establish national fora, with participation by relevant 
stakeholders, to discuss patient safety and national activities. 
 To safeguard working conditions for all healthcare professions and 
to ensure that policies on recruitment and retention are linked to 
patient safety. 
 To recognize and support the user training provided by medical 
devices, tools and appliances manufacturers thereby ensuring the 
safe use of new medical technology and surgical techniques. 
 To include patient safety in the standard training of health 
professionals combined with integrated methods and procedures 
that are embedded in a culture of continuous learning and 
improvement. 
 To ensure that national regulatory framework protects the 
privacy and confidentiality of patient records in the best 
interests of the patient, while at the same time ensuring that 
relevant patient information is readily available to healthcare 
professionals. 
 To create a culture that focuses on learning from near misses and 
adverse events as opposed to concentrating on “blame and 
shame” and subsequent punishment. 
 
The conference recommends to healthcare providers: 
 To facilitate a collaborative care approach between health 
professionals and healthcare providers, aimed at enhancing 
patient safety. 
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 To implement work place projects focusing on patient safety and 
to establish an open culture to deal with errors and omissions 
more effectively. 
 To initiate a co-operation between patients/relatives and 
healthcare professionals in order that patients/relatives are 
aware of near misses and adverse events. 
 
List of supporting organizations to the Luxembourg Declaration on Patient Safety: 
European Commission, DG Health and Consumer Protection, Luxembourg Presidency (first half of 2005), Presidency of 
the United Kingdom, European Association of Senior Hospital Physicians (AEMH), Standing Committee of European 
Doctors (CPME), European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), European Health 
Management Association (EHMA), European Health Telematics Association (EHTEL), European Patients' Forum (EPF), 
European Society for Quality in Healthcare (ESQH), European Medical Technology Industry Association (Eucomed), 
European Hospital and Healthcare Federation (HOPE), Standing Committee of Nurses of the European Union (PCN), 
Pharmaceutical Group of the European Union (PGEU), European Diagnostic Manufacturers Association (EDMA), Dutch 
Institute for Healthcare Improvement (CBO), Danish Society for Patient Safety (DSFP), European Association for Medical 
Device Reprocessing (EAMDR), Austrian Association of Hospital Pharmacists (AAHP), European Association of Hospital 
Pharmacists (EAHP) 
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Appendix 5: “Good Doctors, Safer Patients” 
Change recommendations 
I. “design a strong, effective interface between local healthcare systems 
for assuring good clinical governance and patient safety, and the system 
of regulating the practice of individual doctors; 
 
II. establish clearer and more rigorous public accountability for the 
performance of the systems intended to promote and assure good 
practice and protect patients from bad practice; 
 
III. introduce a system of regular assessment of doctors’ practice which 
overcomes the weaknesses of the current revalidation proposals, is 
valued by the medical profession, is trusted by the public, is effective 
and is sustainable in the long term; 
 
IV. create for generic and specialist domains of medical practice clear 
standards that are valid, reliable, capable of assessment and 
transparent to the public, professionals and employers; 
 
V. develop good methods of assessment that: measure a doctor’s 
performance against a predetermined standard; assess knowledge, skills 
and task performance; are relevant to the day-to-day work that a doctor 
undertakes; represent value for money, and create the opportunity for 
a doctor to develop and improve; 
 
VI. reduce the climate of blame, retribution and disciplinary action that 
usually attends poor medical performance, and introduce stronger 
elements of prevention and earlier recognition of problems, retraining 
and rehabilitation; 
 
VII. eliminate situations where poor practice is not recognised and acted 
upon because of adverse organisational culture, weak local clinical 
governance, poor employment practice, variable standards for judging 
performance, doctors being between jobs, or locations or situations 
where it is unclear whose responsibility it is to take action; 
 
VIII. reshape the role, structure and functions of the General Medical Council 
to focus it on the core activities of investigating serious complaints 
(rather than adjudicating on them), maintaining the medical and 
specialist registers, and overseeing the system of quality assurance of 
standards of practice whilst devolving more assessment and decision 
making to a local level; 
 
IX. ensure a stronger interface between complaints about clinical services 
and complaints about doctors; 
 
X. give educational and standard-setting bodies a more formal role in 
medical regulation.” 
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Action recommendations  
 
I. the creation of a clear, unambiguous and operationalised standard to 
define a good doctor, and its adoption into the contracts of all doctors 
 
II. measures to reduce the risk of poorly performing doctors falling through 
the net, especially since the expansion in the diversity of roles, working 
patterns and practice settings 
 
III. steps to further the consistency with which medical education is 
managed across undergraduate and postgraduate curricula;  
 
IV. improve access for the public to timely and meaningful information 
about doctors, coupled with measures to ensure that such information is 
handled intelligently 
135 
 
 
Appendix 6: Financial incentives and quality 
1. Financial incentives directed at improving quality 
I. The findings from studies on the effect of payer initiatives that reward 
providers for quality improvements or the attainment of quality 
benchmarks are mixed. Relatively few significant impacts are reported, 
and it is often the case that payer programmes include quality 
improvement components in addition to incentive payments, making it 
difficult to assess the independent effect of the financial incentives. 
II. Very little research has been done on the impact of direct payments to 
hospitals to improve quality. The published research to date in this area 
is too limited to draw conclusions with confidence. 
III. Though relatively more attention has been paid to preventive services, 
there is limited evidence that targeted interventions employing 
financial incentives to improve the delivery of preventive services are 
effective. The few studies in this area with strong research designs find 
small, if any, effects of payments to providers that are intended to 
improve quality.  
IV. The accumulated body of research described in this chapter is not yet 
sufficient to assess the relative significance of identified barriers to the 
effective design and implementation of pay-for-performance initiatives. 
There are large pay-for-performance programmes underway in the US 
and the UK with more evaluations likely to appear in the peer-reviewed 
literature in the near future. Because of the variation in the way these 
programmes have been designed and implemented, synthesizing their 
findings to provide useful guidance for decision-makers will be 
challenging. It will be especially important to have comprehensive 
reporting of results in future studies (not limiting results to a subset of 
quality measures rewarded by payers), accompanied by complete 
descriptions of study context and possible confounding factors. In the 
meantime, policy-makers can support, and learn from, process 
evaluations of ongoing pay-for-performance efforts with particular 
attention to accurate documentation of costs as well as continued 
tracking of outcomes. 
 
2. Secondary impacts on quality of financial incentives directed at 
reducing utilization and costs 
I. The evidence regarding the secondary impacts of financial 
incentives on quality of care is not compelling. There are several 
possible explanations. First, the incentives studied were 
designed, for the most part, to reduce utilization of services. 
Generally, the hypothetical link between service reduction and 
quality in the studies is not clear, especially where utilization 
may have been excessive prior to the introduction of different 
payment arrangements. Second, the literature reports results for 
a wide range of quality and outcome measures, making it difficult 
to detect patterns in the findings. The most commonly used 
outcome measure – mortality – may not be sensitive to the 
relatively modest changes in financial incentives found in many 
studies. Also, mortality can be influenced by a host of factors, 
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many unrelated to medical care, making it difficult to isolate the 
marginal effects of financial incentives. 
II. How incentives are transmitted to the level at which decisions 
about treatment are actually made is not clear in most studies. 
Typically, information is lacking concerning other efforts to 
address quality via the health plan, hospital, and physician 
practice or government agencies. It seems likely that these 
efforts would interact with financial incentives for providers to 
influence quality of care. Most studies do not control for these 
quality management efforts when drawing conclusions about the 
impact of financial incentives. 
III. The use of multiple quality of care and patient outcome 
indicators in a single research study enables a richer 
interpretation of findings. However, when results are conflicting 
in these situations, no clear overall picture of the impact of 
incentives emerges. Also, it is not clear in most of these studies if 
the authors adjusted their statistical tests to account for the 
multiple comparisons undertaken in their analyses. 
IV. The exact nature of provider payment arrangements often is not 
clearly described in the studies. This is true in particular for 
comparisons of quality of care under different insurance 
arrangements. Because the relationships between payment 
arrangements and quality are likely to be more subtle than the 
links between payment and service utilization, the absence of a 
description of provider payment incentives makes interpretation 
of findings even more difficult. 
V. Many of the studies were cross-sectional in design. There may 
have been considerable variability in provider quality of care, 
irrespective of financial incentives, that made it difficult for 
researchers to detect the influence of financial incentives on 
quality without access to adequate control variables. 
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Appendix 7: A collaborative model of translating evidence 
into practice 
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Appendix 8:  Steps of Barrier Identification and Mitigation 
(BIM) Tool 
Step 1. Assemble the interdisciplinary team 
The team should be composed of frontlinge care practitioners (physicians, 
nurses, technicians), administrators, and human factors and quality 
improvement specialists.  
 
Step 2. Identify barriers 
This step includes thress methods of data collection that can be performed in 
parallel. Each investigator collects data independently using these collection 
methods and records both the barriers and possible corrective actions on Table 
3. This step may take 2-6 hours.  
Method 1: Observe the process: Observe staff attempting to use the 
guideline and record 
Steps skipped 
Work-arounds (other process steps) 
Why it is difficult to comply 
Factors that support compliance (i.e. guideline facilitators) 
 
Method 2: Ask about the process: Ask staff through interviews or short 
questionnaires whether they  
Are aware of the guideline 
Agree with the guideline (i.e., Do staff think that the guideline is 
appropriate for their patients?) 
Have any suggestions to improve compliance with guideline 
 
Method 3: Walk the process 
Try to comply with the guideline using simulation or, if 
appropriate, under real circumstances.  
 
Continue collecting data until no new barriers are identified upon new data 
collection and a comprehensive understanding of current practices used and 
barriers to guideline compliance is achieved 
 
Step 3. Summarize barriers (table 3) 
A team member compiles the data collected y several investigators on Table 3. 
 
Step 4. Prioritize barriers (Table 4) 
The interdisciplinary team reviews and discusses the barrier summary. The 
team prioritized barriers based on two criteria: 
1. Likelihood: probability of experiencing a barrier 
2. Severity: probability that barrier will lead to noncompliance 
Pronovost, The Joint commission Journal on Quality and Patient Safety, 35, 526-32, Oct 2009 
139 
 
Appendix 9: Comprehensive Unit-based Patient Safety 
Program (CUSP) 
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htt
www.patientsafetygroup.org/program/media/flowchart.pdf 
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Appendix 10: The survey  
The introduction e-mail 
Dear colleague! 
 
First, we thank you for being willing to dedicate time to answer our current 
poll. The questionnaire, which is answered anonymously, seeks to shed light on 
whether there is any relationship between patient safety and the department’s 
characteristics and doctors' continuous medical education. The questionnaire 
consists of 23 questions (taking about ten minutes to complete it) and may have 
implications for how the patient safety work and continuing education should 
be arranged in the future. 
 
The questionnaire has been sent to all academic and administrative managers 
in the intensive care units at university hospitals. It has also been sent to other 
defined decision-makers at the same units. This means that there are 
approximately 30 people who received the questionnaire and each response is 
thus very valuable. The short-term goal of this study is to determine the status 
with regard to the relationship between patient safety and factors related to 
the departments and physicians, including doctors' continuous medical 
education. 
 
The information will be analyzed and initially used in a master’s thesis which 
deals with this topic. The long-term goal is - through dialogue and cooperation - 
to help develop the Norwegian intensive care units to the most knowledgeable 
and patient secure in Europe. The first requirement in order to achieve this is 
precisely the belief that one can be the best. Furthermore, it requires of 
course, hard work and clear goals and means. We hope that our study may 
contribute to discussions in the academic community and inspire a common 
effort for such an improvement. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Albert Castellheim, MD, PhD           John-Arne Røttingen 
Chief senior consultant                                  Professor, MD, PhD 
       Director of Norwegian Knowledge    
                                                                     Centre for the Health Services             
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The questionnaire  
 
I. Patient safety and errors in the intensive care unit 
1- Do you think that the patient safety level is acceptable in your 
department? 
1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
There are two types of medical errors; “error of commission” which means 
that things that should not happen, happen anyway (like amputation of the 
wrong leg), while “error of omission” means that things which should  
happen, do not happen (like the lack of insulin administration when blood 
glucose is high).  
 
2- To what extent do you think that there's medical errors in your 
department? 
1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
3- What kind of mistakes do you think that doctors in your department 
make most frequently? Put only one tick. 
1 Error of commission 
2 Both types of errors occur approximately at the same frequency 
3 Error of omission 
4 Do not know / not applicable 
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II. System and structural factors that may affect patient safety 
System and structural factors may be of great importance for quality and 
patient safety. Organizational structure includes leadership, personal and 
material resources, capacity and treatment procedures as well as the 
department's culture which consists of its "history" plus a number of other 
factors. These factors consist of both individual-depended factors (as 
motivation and competence) and social-depended factors (such as 
colleagues' views, cooperation) 
 
To what extent do you think 
4- Leadership performance in your department is important for patient 
safety? 
1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
5- Material resources and the treatment capacity in your department is 
important for patient safety? 
1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
6- Explicit clinical procedures in your department are important for patient 
safety?  
1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
7- Colleagues' attitudes to the introduction of new procedures or 
treatments are important for patient safety?  
1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
III. Physician factors that may affect patient safety 
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There are several physician factors that may affect patient safety. In the 
following there are several questions regarding your views about the 
importance of these factors to maintain or improve patient safety. 
 
To what extent do you think doctor’s 
8- Motivation is important for patient safety in your department? 
1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
9- Theoretical knowledge is important for patient safety in your 
department? 
1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
10- Practical skills are important for patient safety in your department? 
1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
11- To what extent do you think doctor’s ethical awareness is important for 
patient safety in your department? 
1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
IV. Department-based patient safety 
In the following we have listed five quality and patient safety measures at 
department level. The questions deal with your views about the importance of 
these measures in the intensive care units in general. 
 
To what extent do you think  
12- Physicians' reporting of adverse events (without risk of sanctions) is 
important to promote good patient safety in the intensive care units in 
general? 
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1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
13- Root cause analysis based on the reporting of adverse events is important 
for patient safety in the intensive care units in general? 
1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
14- IT-based solutions (for example in the drug administration / reminders / 
support for clinical decisions) are important for patient safety in the 
intensive care units in general? 
1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
15- External audit and feedback are important for patient safety in the 
intensive care units in general? 
1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
V. Knowledge, experience and continuous medical education  
There is disagreement about how to organize the continuous medical education 
(CME) for specialists. There have been proposed several models like "self-
steering model“ in which physicians self manage their own CME, and 
“profession-steering model” where the profession (for example through The 
Norwegian Medical Association) manages CME. According to this model the 
physician completes a profession- approved mandatory program required for 
applying recertification and getting recertified periodically (for example, GPs 
in Norway). The mandatory program may consist of participation in approved 
courses and other activities like participation in colleague-based small groups. 
The third CME model is the "regulation model". This model is similar to 
profession-steering model in that there are mandatory requirements for CME 
and need for periodic recertification, but in addition, it requires some kind of 
audit or control before recertification can take place. It also includes a 
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completion program for those who cannot meet audit requirements and cannot 
be recertified immediately. Regulation model is usually practiced in form of a 
partnership between the state and the profession, like England. 
In the following there are several questions about your views on the importance 
of various CME models on patient safety. 
 
To what extent do you think 
16- Clinical experience alone is sufficient to achieve high degree of patient 
safety? 
1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
17- Self-steering model (for example “LEIF” program from The Norwegian 
Medical Association) is important to achieve high degree of patient 
safety? 
1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
 
18- Profession-steering model of CME (for example, GPs in Norway) is 
important to achieve high degree of patient safety? 
1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
19- Regulation model of CME is important to achieve high degree of patient 
safety? 
1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
VI. Measures and the need of action 
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20- If you are going to improve patient safety in your department, which 
department-based measure do you choose to take (if none of these are 
implemented)? Choose two options.      
Reporting of adverse events 
Root cause analysis based on reporting of adverse events 
Clinical procedures 
IT-based solutions 
External audit and feedback 
Structure changes (changes in organization, management, culture, 
cooperation and partnership forms) 
Not applicable 
 
21- If you are going to improve patient safety in your department through 
increasing competency of physician staff, what kind of CME do you 
choose as the most appropriate? Choose only one option. 
Self-steering model 
Profession-steering model 
Regulation model 
 
 
22- Altogether, do you think it is necessary to improve patient safety in your 
department? 
1 Not at all 
2 To a small extent 
3 To some extent 
4 To a great extent 
5 To a very large extent 
6 Do not know / not applicable 
 
23- Comments and reflections: 
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The numeric presentation of the results 
 
1-Do you think that the patient safety level is acceptable in your department? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2- To what extent do you think there are medical errors in your department? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3- What kind of mistakes do you think that doctors in your department make 
most frequently? Put only one tick. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4- To what extent do you think that leadership performance in your 
department is important for patient safety? 
4 Leadership performance  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
To a small extent 7.1 4.3 
1 Existing patient safety level  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
To a small extent 0.0 8.3 
To some extent 14.3 8.3 
To a great extent 50.0 70.8 
To a very large extent 35.7 12.5 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
2 Occurance of medical errors  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
To a small extent 57.1 41.7 
To some extent 42.9 54.2 
To a great extent 0.0 4.2 
To a very large extent 0.0 0.0 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
3 Kind of errors   Leaders ESICM 
Commission 0.0 4.2 
Both 57.1 20.8 
Omission 35.7 54.2 
Do not know / not applicable 7.1 20.8 
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To some extent 21.4 13.0 
To a great extent 35.7 47.8 
To a very large extent 35.7 34.8 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
 
 
5- To what extent do you think that material resources and the treatment 
capacity in your department are important for patient safety?  
5 Material resources  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
To a small extent 21.4 12.5 
To some extent 21.4 8.3 
To a great extent 42.9 37.5 
To a very large extent 14.3 41.7 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
 
 
6- To what extent do you think that explicit clinical procedures in your 
department are important for patient safety? 
6 Clinical procedures  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
To a small extent 7.1 4.2 
To some extent 14.3 20.8 
To a great extent 28.6 37.5 
To a very large extent 50.0 37.5 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
 
 
7- To what extent do you think that colleagues' attitudes to the introduction of 
new procedures or treatments are important for patient safety? 
7 Colleagues attitudes   Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
To a small extent 0.0 8.7 
To some extent 14.3 8.7 
To a great extent 57.1 39.1 
To a very large extent 28.6 43.5 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
 
8- To what extent do you think that physician´s motivation is important for 
patient safety in your department? 
8 Motivation  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
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To a small extent 0.0 4.2 
To some extent 14.3 8.3 
To a great extent 57.1 58.3 
To a very large extent 28.6 29.2 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
 
 
9- To what extent do you think that physician´s theoretical knowledge is 
important for patient safety in your department? 
9 Theoretical knowledge  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
To a small extent 0.0 4.2 
To some extent 21.4 8.3 
To a great extent 57.1 50.0 
To a very large extent 21.4 37.5 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
 
 
10- To what extent do you think that physician´s practical skills are important 
for patient safety in your department? 
10 Practical skills  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
To a small extent 0.0 0.0 
To some extent 28.6 4.2 
To a great extent 50.0 54.2 
To a very large extent 21.4 41.7 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
 
 
11- To what extent do you think that physician´ ethical awareness is important 
for patient safety in your department? 
11 Ethical awareness  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
To a small extent 0.0 8.3 
To some extent 35.7 29.2 
To a great extent 42.9 41.7 
To a very large extent 21.4 20.8 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
 
12- To what extent do you think physicians' reporting of adverse events 
(without risk of sanctions) is  important to  promote good patient 
safety in the intensive care units in general?  
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12 Reporting  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
To a small extent 7.1 0.0 
To some extent 7.1 8.3 
To a great extent 35.7 33.3 
To a very large extent 50.0 58.3 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
 
 
13- To what extent do you think root cause analysis based on the reporting of 
adverse events is important for patient safety in the intensive care units in 
general?  
13 Root cause analyses  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
To a small extent 7.1 0.0 
To some extent 7.1 8.7 
To a great extent 50.0 43.5 
To a very large extent 35.7 47.8 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
 
 
14- To what extent do you think IT-based solutions (for example in the drug 
administration / reminders / support for clinical decisions) are important for 
patient safety in the intensive care units in general? 
14 IT-based solusions  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
To a small extent 14.3 4.2 
To some extent 50.0 41.7 
To a great extent 14.3 33.3 
To a very large extent 21.4 20.8 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
 
15- To what extent do you think external audit and feedback are important for 
patient safety in the intensive care units in general? 
15 Audit & feedback  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
To a small extent 28.6 8.3 
To some extent 35.7 45.8 
To a great extent 28.6 25.0 
To a very large extent 7.1 20.8 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
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16- To what extent do you think clinical experience alone is sufficient to 
achieve high degree of patient safety? 
16 Experience alone  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 14.3 0.0 
To a small extent 21.4 33.3 
To some extent 35.7 54.2 
To a great extent 28.6 12.5 
To a very large extent 0.0 0.0 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
 
 
17- To what extent do you think self-steering model (for example “LEIF” 
program from The Norwegian Medical Association) is important to achieve high 
degree of patient safety?  
17 Self-steering model  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 7.1 0.0 
To a small extent 28.6 12.5 
To some extent 28.6 54.2 
To a great extent 7.1 16.7 
To a very large extent 7.1 0.0 
Do not know / not applicable 21.4 16.7 
 
18- To what extent do you think profession-steering model of CME (for 
example, GPs in Norway) is important to high degree of patient safety? 
18 Profession-steering model  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 4.2 
To a small extent 7.1 0.0 
To some extent 42.9 33.3 
To a great extent 35.7 41.7 
To a very large extent 7.1 12.5 
Do not know / not applicable 7.1 8.3 
 
19- To what extent do you think regulation model of CME is important to high 
degree of patient safety? 
19 Regulation model  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
To a small extent 21.4 4.2 
To some extent 35.7 37.5 
To a great extent 7.1 33.3 
To a very large extent 21.4 4.2 
Do not know / not applicable 14.3 20.8 
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20- If you are going to improve patient safety in your department, which 
department-based measure do you choose to take (if none of these are 
implemented)? Choose two options.       
20 Department-based measure  Leaders ESICM 
Reporting 71.4 8.3 
Root cause analysis 64.3 70.8 
Clinical procedures 28.6 50.0 
IT-based solutions 7.1 8.3 
Audit and feedback 7.1 25.0 
Structure changes 28.6 25.0 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 4.2 
 
21- If you are going to improve patient safety in your department through 
increasing competency of physician staff, what kind of CME do you choose as 
the most appropriate? Choose only one option.  
21 Prefered kind of CME  Leaders ESICM 
Self 25 0.0 
Profession 50 90.5 
Regulation 25 9.5 
 
22- Altogether, do you think it is necessary to improve patient safety in your 
department? 
22 Necessity of improving patient safety  Leaders ESICM 
Not at all 0.0 0.0 
To a small extent 14.3 13.0 
To some extent 57.1 60.9 
To a great extent 21.4 26.1 
To a very large extent 7.1 0.0 
Do not know / not applicable 0.0 0.0 
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Appendix 11: Some useful websites 
 
ACCME 
http://education.accme.org/ 
 
Accreditation Canada 
http://www.accreditation.ca/en/default.aspx 
 
ACMQ - American College of Medical Quality 
http://www.acmq.org/ 
 
AHRQ - Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality - Glossary of Terms 
http://effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/index.cfm/glossary-of-terms/ 
 
AHRQ - Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality - Patient Safety network   
http://www.psnet.ahrq.gov/resource.aspx?resourceID=3601 
 
AMA - Continuing Medical Education 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/education-careers/continuing-medical-
education.shtml 
 
AMA - Physician Consortium for Performance Improvement (PCPI) 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/clinical-practice-
improvement/clinical-quality/physician-consortium-performance-
improvement.shtml 
 
American College of Medical Quality 
http://www.acmq.org/ 
 
BMJ Group 
http://group.bmj.com/ 
 
Comite Permanent Des Medecins Europeens - CPME - Standing Committee Of 
European Doctors 
http://www.cpme.be/index.php 
 
Comprehensive Unit-Based Safety Program (CUSP) 
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/innovation_quality_patient_care/services/co
nsulting/patient_safety_cusp.html 
http://www.innovations.ahrq.gov/content.aspx?id=1769 
http://www.hpoe.org/topic-areas/sub-topic2.shtml#five 
http://www.onthecuspstophai.org/ 
http://www.cha.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=977&Itemi
d=235 
 
Danish Public Health 
https://www.sundhed.dk 
 
Department of Health_UK 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/index.htm 
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DIUS : Further Education - Review of the future role of FE Colleges 
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/furthereducation/index.cfm?fuseaction=content.view
&CategoryID=20 
 
European Commission proposal on Patient Safety 
http://www.esqh.net/Members/noel/nieuws/news20090615173140/view 
 
European Commission, Public Health 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/index_en.htm 
 
European Network for Health Technology Assessment 
http://www.eunethta.net/ 
 
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies 
http://www.euro.who.int/observatory 
 
European Society for quality in healthcare 
http://www.esqh.net/www/about/view?portal_status_title=About%20us 
 
European Union Network for Patient Safety (EUNetPaS)     
http://www.eunetpas.eu/ 
 
General Medical Council 
Guidance on Continuous Professional Development  
http://www.gmc-
uk.org/education/continuing_professional_development/cpd_guidance.asp 
 
Good doctors, safer patients: Proposals to strengthen the system to assure 
and improve the performance of doctors and to protect the safety of 
patients : Department of Health – Publications 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsP
olicyAndGuidance/DH_4137232 
 
Health-EU - The Public Health Portal of the European Union - Patient Safety 
http://ec.europa.eu/health-eu/care_for_me/patient_safety/index_en.htm 
 
Health-EU - The Public Health Portal of the European Union - Quality 
Assurance 
http://ec.europa.eu/health-eu/care_for_me/quality_assurance/index_en.htm 
 
Helsebiblioteket - Kvalitetsforbedring  
Kvalitetsforbedring er et ledelsesansvar!  
http://www.helsebiblioteket.no/kvalitetsforbedring 
 
healthfinder.gov - Your Source for Reliable Health Information 
http://www.healthfinder.gov/ 
 
High Reliability Versus High Autonomy: Dryden, Murphy and Patient Safety            
http://www.chspr.ubc.ca/node/429 
 
High Reliability Management 
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http://www.highreliabilitymanagement.org/ 
 
IAPO - International Alliance of Patients’ Organizations - World Alliance for 
Patient Safety 
http://www.patientsorganizations.org/showarticle.pl?id=576;n=37201 
 
ICH - Interoperability Clearinghouse - Glossary of Terms 
http://www.ichnet.org/glossary.htm 
 
IHI - Institute for Healthcare Improvement 
http://www.ihi.org/ihi 
 
International Forum on Quality & Safety in Healthcare 
http://internationalforum.bmj.com/ 
 
Institute for Quality and Accreditation in Public Health in Denmark 
http://www.ikas.dk/ 
 
International Society for Quality in Health Care. 
http://www.isqua.org/ 
 
Intern journ for quality in health care 
http://intqhc.oxfordjournals.org/current.dtl 
 
Johns Hopkins Anesthesiology & Critical Care Medicine 
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/anesthesiology/ 
 
Kvalitetsforbedring - Helsebiblioteket.no 
http://www.helsebiblioteket.no/kvalitetsforbedring 
 
London Health Science Center_ Adult Critical Care 
http://www.lhsc.on.ca/critcare/icu/ 
 
Mayo School of Continuous Professional Development 
http://www.mayo.edu/cme/ 
 
Nasjonalt råd for kvalitet og prioritering i helsetjenesten 
http://195.159.251.11/Hjem 
 
National Quality Measures Clearingshous 
http://www.qualitymeasures.ahrq.gov/resources/glossary.aspx 
 
New South Wales Government 
http://www.gcio.nsw.gov.au/ 
 
NICE - National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
http://www.nice.org.uk/ 
 
NHS Scottland – Clinical Governance 
http://www.clinicalgovernance.scot.nhs.uk/ 
 
NHS 
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National Patient Safety Agency - National Reporting and Learning Service 
http://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/home/ 
 
Royal College of Physicians - Continuous Professional Development  
http://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/education/cpd/Pages/cpd.aspx 
 
UEMS - European Union of Medical Specialists   
http://www.uems.net/ 
 
PMETB: Home 
http://www.pmetb.org.uk/ 
 
Quality and Mayo Clinic 
http://www.mayoclinic.org/quality/ 
 
Quality and Safety in Health Care (QSHC) 
http://qshc.bmj.com/ 
 
Quality Tips 
http://www.learnicu.org/Quality_and_Safety/Quality/Pages/Quality_Tips.aspx
?token=B6BF1E62-705D-4318-9CBB-92FFE836F494 
 
Revalidation BMJ 
http://careers.bmj.com/careers/advice/article-
search.html?action=browseByTopic&categoryId=1008&utm_campaign=7119312&
utm_content=42013439382&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Emailvision 
 
Royal College of Physicians 
http://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/Pages/index.aspx 
 
SIMPATIE_Safety Improvement for Patients in Europe 
http://www.simpatie.org/Main 
 
Society of Critical Care Medicine - Quality corner 
http://www.sccm.org/Professional_Development/QualityCorner/Pages/default
.aspx 
 
The Health Foundation 
http://www.health.org.uk/ 
 
The Shipman Inquiry 
http://www.the-shipman-inquiry.org.uk/home.asp 
 
Scottish Safer Patient Programme   
http://www.ihi.org/IHI/Programs/StrategicInitiatives/ScottishPatientSafetyPro
gramme.htm 
 
The Cheshire and Mersey Critical Care Network 
http://www.warrington-pct.nhs.uk/ 
 
The Health Foundation’s Safer Patients Network 
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http://www.ihi.org/IHI/Programs/StrategicInitiatives/SaferPatientsNetwork.ht
m 
 
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services - AHRQ - Agency for Health 
Research and Quality - Making Health Care Safer A Critical Analysis of 
Patient Safety Practices 
http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/ptsafety/ 
 
WHO - World Health Organization - Patient Safety 
http://www.who.int/patientsafety/en/ 
 
